Russia:
The State of Civil and Human Rights before the Presidential Election

Unfree elections,
Restrictions of the Freedom of Assembly,
Political Prisoners in 2017
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Фото на обложке – Евгений Фельдман.
Statement on election monitoring results of Single Election Day on September 10, 2017

The “Golos” movement conducted long-term and short-term public monitoring of the Single Election Day elections in Russia on September 10, 2017. The monitoring resulted in analytical reports and the following statement.

"On September 10, Russia held administratively controlled elections"

ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Election commissions organizing elections in the Russian Federation

Analysis of the current composition of 22 election commissions of the entities of the Russian Federation, which organize major elections, allows us to conclude that their current formation procedure does not appropriately take into account the interests of non-parliamentary parties and of civil society.

Despite the efforts of the Central Election Commission (CEC) of the Russian Federation to reduce the share of state and municipal employees in the commissions, the tendency for a disproportionate strengthening of the position of the United Russia party in the commissions continues. This is happening largely because of the introduction of United Russia members and functionaries to the commissions, as well as of party-related persons from public associations, municipal entities, and other organizations.

In our opinion, the positive trend towards an increase in representation of parties that don’t belong to the “federal four” (United Russia, Communist Party, Liberal Democratic Party, and Fair Russia) in the composition of the election commissions of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation established in the period 2016-2017, is currently happening without taking into account the real political weight of specific non-parliamentary parties and their support by voters in the regions.
At the same time, it must be admitted that the regional authorities continue to play a decisive role in forming the composition and especially the leadership of the electoral commissions of the subjects of the Russian Federation, and that the influence of the CEC of Russia on this process remains very limited.

The dependency of several election commissions on regional authorities manifested itself during the election campaigns of 2017. We are primarily referring to the territorial election commissions of the city of Moscow, as well as the election commissions of the Altai Territory, whose controversial actions and decisions aroused widespread negative reaction from election participants, the general public, and the CEC of Russia. We believe that, with regard to these elections and following the results of the 2017 election campaign, there organizational changes ought to be made related to the aforementioned commissions.

**Nomination and registration of candidates and party lists for state representative bodies.** The level of competition remains relatively low – confirmed in particular by the results of the gubernatorial (heads of regions) elections. We would like to stress the reduction in the number of self-nominated candidates. The degree of electoral competition varies widely by region and hinges largely on the organizational capacity of administrative officials. The most competitive elections were the municipal elections, particularly in certain municipalities of Moscow.

The lists of the Duma parties, the so-called “federal four” (United Russia, Communist Party, Liberal Democratic Party, and Fair Russia), were registered without hindrance (although attempts were made to remove the Communist Party lists in some regions using the court, they ultimately remained on the ballots), while other, “non-parliamentary” parties were faced with denials of registration.

In comparison with previous years, the work of election commissions organizing the elections was more open and informative. But problems with obtaining the necessary information and getting access to election documents remain, and have been reported in regard to regional, territorial, and municipal election commissions.

In 2017, unlike in the elections of 2014 and 2015, no cases were documented in which the election commissions themselves directly prevented the nomination and registration of candidates or party lists. At the same time, commissions that organize the elections (as well as regional and local administrations) provided selective support for nomination and registration to those political players who act as “spoilers” or “technical” candidates.
Administrative control over the elections has shifted to the preliminary stage of the election campaign, to the process of selecting and nominating candidates and party lists, and to the stage of holding party conferences. There have been cases of exerting administrative pressure, including by security forces, on certain prospective candidates, as well as members and heads of regional and local branches of political parties, with the goal of preventing the nomination of those prospective candidates.

The wide participation of state and municipal employees and top officials in purely party and political events related to the nomination and registration of candidates and lists of candidates from the “United Russia” party has become such a common practice that it is no longer perceived as something dubious or inadmissible.

In the municipal elections in Moscow, informal socio-political groups successfully supported the nomination and registration of independent and opposition candidates. This phenomenon is natural, but also expresses the crisis of the entire political party system, and its inadequacy to represent the interests of large swaths of the population.

**Nomination and registration of candidates for the elections of the heads of regions.** To sum up: on September 10, 2017, the Russian Federation held direct elections of senior officials of the subjects of the Russian Federation in 16 regions.

As in previous years, the most acute problems in the election of the heads of regions are linked to candidates overcoming the so-called “municipal filter.” The “Golos” movement consistently opposes the use of this method of screening candidates as one that restricts the electoral rights of citizens (both the right to be elected and the right to elect) and hampers political competition. “Golos” believes that it is impossible to hold free and competitive elections of heads of the subjects of the Russian Federation while the “municipal filter” is in place.

The existing “municipal filter” practice is accompanied by widespread “administrative pressure” on municipal deputies and by the use of public resources (organizational, logistic, informational, and other) to ensure collection of signatures in favor of certain administrative candidates (current heads or deputies), as well as in favor of so-called “technical” candidates who are running to ensure the appearance of competition in elections. Instead of being a mechanism of electoral support for candidates for the post of head of region, it is actually a means of political filtration of rivals who are, for one reason or another, unacceptable to regional authorities. These assumptions are confirmed by the extremely weak election results of candidates running against current regional heads. What is
more, election commissions, judicial and law enforcement bodies, local communities, political parties, the media, public organizations, and the candidates themselves have no effective legal instruments at their disposal with which to oppose this de facto administrative lawlessness.

**Election campaigning.** Reports on the use of administrative resources for campaigning purposes came from a wide range of regions and referred to elections on various levels.

Officials, state, and municipal employees, as well as employees of budget organizations took an active role in campaigning and mobilizing events in the interest of administrative candidates and nominees from the “United Russia” party. Public events organized by state or municipal authorities and financed by budgetary funds were widely used for conducting election campaigning. This was especially the case in the elections of the heads of regions.

Traditionally, a characteristic feature of the gubernatorial (heads of regions) elections are the ceremonial and “official” activities of the acting heads of regions, which tend to increase in frequency during the campaign, as well as the associated covert campaigning in the media under the guise of informing citizens about the official or public activities of administrative candidates. These circumstances and conditions violate the principle of equality of election participants: competitors of acting heads have no opportunity for equal access to informational resources, and hence to voters.

Although, with the exception of a few regions, campaigning activities, especially in the form of visual campaigning in the streets, were rare in the September 10 elections, there were still cases of obstruction of campaign activities of some candidates and parties. They happened at different elections and took forms such as creating difficulties and obstacles in conducting campaigning events; destroying and damaging campaign materials; putting administrative pressure on candidates; and using “black PR” (activities aimed at destroying someone’s reputation). Reports of damage and destruction of campaign materials mainly came from municipal election campaigns and increased noticeably a week before Election Day, especially in Moscow.

**Administrative electoral technologies.** The week before Election Day was marked by several scandals related to early voting in municipal elections in the Altai Territory (Barnaul) and Primorsky Territory (Vladivostok, Nakhodka), as well as in Moscow and the Leningrad Region (Kuzmolovskoye).

In the Altai Territory, early voting took place in the elections of the deputies of the Barnaul Municipal Duma, with anomalously high indicators of voter partici-
pation, making it possible to conclude that an administrative inflation of turnout numbers was aimed at distorting the election results. In the Primorsky Territory, during the election of deputies to the city duma of Vladivostok and Nakhodka, there were cases of centrally organized transportation of voters to voting stations, and of voter bribery in the early voting stage. Similarly to the Altai and Primorye elections – and with similar scandals – early voting was held in the Kuzmolovsky township in the Leningrad Region.

In Moscow, on the contrary, during the elections in municipal districts, the territorial commissions massively rejected voters’ attempts to exercise their right to vote early with a valid reason. Unprecedented and illegal demands to provide supporting documents in the absence of signs of involuntary voting prevented many voters from voting early. Often the actions of members of election commissions towards voters who came to vote early were extremely disrespectful. In addition, the process of informing the voters about municipal elections in Moscow, which is the responsibility of election commissions, was vastly insufficient.

The introduction of a **new voting procedure for voters at their current location** should be recognized as a positive development. A significant number of voters in 20 regions (245,000, or 1% of the total number of voters in these regions) were able to use this mechanism. This applies, first of all, to voters registered in rural settlements but actually living in the cities, mainly in regional centers.

At the same time, the organization of this process was far from smooth, and did not receive the appropriate degree of publicity.

For example, in a number of regions (specifically, in Republic of Mari El, Republic of Mordovia, Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Yaroslavl regions), a high proportion of voters applied for this procedure in the five days prior to Election Day (special applications with the stamp). Only 20-26% of voters who submitted such applications did so five or more days before Election Day (which is to say that 75-80% submitted them four day or less before Election Day). This indicates at least a lack of explanatory work on behalf on election organizers.

From the Saratov region came reports of citizens with five special applications with stamps who were instructed to vote at five different polling stations. One report about the possibility of a double vote came from the Ryazan region.

Over the course of the entire period of filing applications for voting at the voter’s current location (i.e. since July 26, 2017), neither the CEC of Russia nor the election commissions of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation provided detailed information on the development of this process. The CEC only issued information on the break-down of such voting in the regions on August 30.
Data on voters who submitted applications five or more days before Election Day were published by the CEC only on the evening of September 8 (in the Sakhalin region, it was already September 9 at the time), thereby preventing election participants from analyzing them in advance and using them in the monitoring process. In addition, this data was published in a format that made it extremely difficult to analyze: the data was available only for each polling station, without summary tables and aggregation at higher levels.

At the same time, our analysis shows that practically in all the regions the numbers on the registers for the inclusion of voters in the lists did not match up with the numbers for the exclusion of voters. This indicates that the registry data compilation system is not working smoothly. In addition, from the explanation offered by the CEC, it follows that there are many discrepancies between the addresses of voters indicated in their passports and their addresses in the voter register. This means that the voter register contains numerous inaccuracies, and that their elimination should be made a priority (taking into account, among other things, that this register is used to verify signatures of voters submitted by candidates).

Data on voters who submitted applications less than five days prior to Election Day was published fairly promptly – on the morning of September 10. The data was also published for each polling station, but, unlike previous data, the total number of such voters by region was also published. However, the sum for all the regions turned out to be 19,427, whereas the CEC chairman on the morning of September 10 announced a different number – 21,928 – with the explanation that this is the most recent data. Nevertheless, the data posted on the portal “Vybor” throughout the day on September 10 had not been adjusted.

We believe that the lack of publicity and inconsistencies within the final data substantially reduce the level of citizens’ confidence in the new voting procedure at the current locations.

Election Day also demonstrated that the new voting procedure at the current location through pre-submitted applications provides broad and uncontrolled opportunities for organized mobilization of administratively reliant categories of voters (workers of large enterprises, budget institutions, and others).
ELECTION DAY

The low turnout observed in these elections was caused in the first place by the low level of competition and by the voters’ distrust towards the election process that had developed over the course of recent years.

Undoubtedly, the policy of intolerance to violations and fraud, which had been publically adopted by the new leadership of the Central Election Commission of Russia, as well as the Committee’s attitude towards observers as allies rather than enemies, had an overall positive effect on the election process. These efforts, along with legislative restrictions on the removal of observers, significantly reduced the number of violations of voters’ rights compared to previous years.

Nevertheless, observations of the September 10 elections suggest that illegal strategies and tactics are still prevalent in certain regions.

From a number of polling stations, we have received reports of documented election rigging: ballot box stuffing and exertion of pressure on voters by their employers or superiors; illegal campaigning; illegal transportation and bribery of voters; violations of the “home” voting procedure; violations of the rights of observers, members of commissions, and representatives of the media; and violations of counting procedures.

On Election Day and during the subsequent period of vote counting, the hotline of the movement “Golos” (8 800 333-33-50) received 1,200 phone calls (and a total of over 1,300 during the entire election campaign period). On Election Day, the “Map of Violations” service received 825 reports of possible violations (with over 1,500 messages received during the whole election campaign period).

The most common messages received on Election Day by the “Map of Violations” pertained to the following infractions:

- violation of the “home” voting procedure, illegal voting – 173 calls (21% of the total number of calls)
- violation of the rights of observers, commission members, and media representatives – 158 (19%)
- violation of the rules for summarizing election results, distortion of election results – 110 (13.3%) (It is important to stress that the percentage of reports on these violations has increased compared to previous years.)
• coerced of voters, violation of the secrecy of the vote – 102 (12.3%)
  (The share of reports on such violations compared to previous years has also increased.)

• illegal campaigning – 94 (11.4%)

• violation of polling station design – 58 (7%) (Compared to the previous years, there were significantly fewer complaints from observers regarding the design of polling stations.)

• non-inclusion in voter lists, failure to grant voting rights – 19 (2.35%).

Information on criminal violations – 32 messages in total, including ballot stuffing (with varying degrees of detail) – came from 10 regions. We should pay particular attention to the investigation of incidents in two regions, the Krasnodar Territory and the Saratov Region, where the largest number of ballot stuffing reports originated. Reports of various procedural irregularities, including instances of voting taking place outside designated voting premises, came from 33 regions.

Complaints about the (organized) transport of groups of voters to polling stations came from 10 regions. There is reason to doubt the voluntary participation of these voters.

Illegal campaigning on Election Day was observed in 26 regions, and reports on voter bribery came from 15 regions. We are particularly concerned about a large-scale “lottery” for voters in the Sverdlovsk region, which included prizes such as apartments, cars, and other valuable objects. There is evidence that the lottery coupons were handed out directly at the polling stations.

The number of violations related to the refusal of admission to observers at polling stations, and instances of their illegal removal from the premises, are down from previous years. At the same time, we should note that, whereas earlier such violations most often happened during the first half of Election Day, when the rights of observers were violated at the stage of their non-admission to polling stations, now such violations occur more frequently in the later stages of the voting process and during vote counting.

Vote counting violations were reported at polling stations in 21 regions, specifically: lack of publicity regarding the count, violation of the vote counting procedure, and restriction of the rights of observers. At the same time, in some areas of Moscow, the procedure of summarizing the results in the Territorial Electoral
Commissions was artificially delayed.

Various examples of such violations were reported by “Golos” on Election Day: in three reports (at 12:00 a.m., 6:00 p.m., and 12:00 p.m.), in the election day chronicle, in press releases of the regional offices, and on the “Map of Violations.”

PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

Observations by the “Golos” movement of the September 10 elections on Single Election Day – including long-term observation (during the entire election campaign) and short-term observation (on Election Day itself) – warrant us to issue the following preliminary recommendations.

To the federal legislator (the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the President of the Russian Federation):

• Protect electoral legislation from manipulation in the interest of the ruling party and of individual subjects of the political process. In making changes to electoral legislation, first ensure the principle of equality of election participants as well as of the interests of the voters.

• Introduce amendments to electoral legislation that ensure real competition in elections at all levels; in particular, restore the possibility of registering candidates and party lists on the basis of electoral pledge, reform the voter signature registration system, and cancel or significantly reform the deputy signature registration system (the so-called “municipal filter”).

• Create necessary conditions for public observation at elections, and legislatively establish the institution of election observation by public associations.

• Reform the system of forming election commissions: exclude the participation of executive officials in election commissions. Increase to two thirds the proportion of members of election commissions nominated by political (and not only parliamentary) parties, and establish an order in which priority is given to parties more dependent on voter support. Carry out the reform of election commissions in the city of Moscow.
• Increase the fine for administrative offenses related to the violation of the rights of observers and members of election commissions. Simplify the procedure for appointing observers to polling stations.

• Oblige heads of regions and municipalities that are candidates for elections to go on vacation for the period of the election campaign.

• Completely exclude any possibility of using public events organized at the expense of budgetary funds and/or with the participation of officials performing their official duties for the purpose of election campaigning of individual candidates and parties.

• Introduce amendments to Russian electoral legislation that close the gap for financing election funds from companies that have foreign owners or belong to the state of the Russian Federation, constituent entities of the Federation, or municipalities.

• Improve the procedure for provision, financial reporting, and monitoring of political consulting services to candidates and parties in order to increase their transparency.

To election commissions:

• Ensure a completely independent, collegial, open, and transparent decision-making process, as required by current electoral legislation.

• Do not implement recommendations and informal instructions that do not comply with current electoral legislation.

• Ensure greater protection of commission members in the event of their prosecution for refusing to commit unlawful acts.

• Eliminate any element of arbitrariness and selectivity in the decision making process.

• Ensure the equality of all candidates and parties in the nomination, collection, and verification of signatures and registration, as well as in the conduct of election campaigning and other electoral activities.

• Create the most favorable conditions possible for equal access of candidates and parties to the media.
• Develop a set of measures to identify and suppress indirect campaigning, carried out under the guise of informing the public about the official activities of a candidate.

• Tighten control over campaigning activities not financed from official electoral funds, such as by using administrative resources and obtaining unequal access to the media.

• When publishing data on legal entities, disclose information about the ultimate owners of the companies, including those of closed joint-stock companies.

• When publishing information on the sources of election fund financing, indicate the TIN of the relevant legal entity.

• (To the CEC of Russia:) Ensure compliance of election commissions with the legal procedure for counting votes and summarizing election results.

To candidates and political parties:

• Stick to the principles and methods of fair competition in election campaigns.

• Do not resort to using the help of an “administrative resource.”

To the mass media:

• Ensure equal opportunity for all candidates and parties to access print space, airtime, and network resources.

• Ensure objectivity and equality of candidates and parties in election coverage.

• Abstain from publishing custom-made campaigning materials of a negative nature.

To judicial and law enforcement bodies:

• Take real measures to identify and punish patrons and organizers of crimes committed by members of election commissions and associated with the falsification of voting and election results.
• Investigate violations and crimes more thoroughly, based on evidence and equality of testimony.

• Prevent election offenses related to taking advantage of official positions.

• Tighten control over campaign activities not financed from election funds, such as by using administrative resources and obtaining disproportionate access to the media.

• Prevent various actions that impede the legitimate campaign activities of candidates and electoral associations.

• Do not follow politically motivated instructions.
Conclusions

On Single Election Day (hereafter referred to as “SED”) on September 10, 2017, direct elections of senior officials of the subjects of the Russian Federation (hereinafter “governors” or “heads”) will be held in 16 regions of the country: the Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Karelia, Republic of Mordovia, Republic of Mari El, Udmurtia Republic, Perm Krai, Belgorod region, Kaliningrad region, Kirov region, Novgorod region, Ryazan region, Saratov region, Sverdlovsk region, Tomsk region, Yaroslavl region, and Sevastopol.

As in previous years, the most acute problems in the election of the heads of regions are linked to candidates overcoming the so-called “municipal filter.”

The informally called “municipal filter” means that in Russia candidates for the post of governor (or head of a region) are required to collect signatures of a certain percentage of deputies of municipalities and heads of municipal entities in order to be eligible. The mandatory percentage varies from region to region, from 5% to 10%. There are further requirements as to how the signatures have to be distributed throughout the territorial entities and institutions of the region.

In 8 out of 16 regions, non-systemic candidates failed to overcome the “municipal filter” because of obstruction by local and regional authorities. Almost universally in Russia, independent candidates failed to collect the required number of signatures of municipal deputies because of severe “administrative pressure.”

The “Golos” movement consistently opposes the use of this method of screening candidates as one that restricts the electoral rights of citizens (both the right to be elected and the right to elect) and hampers political competition. The existing “municipal filter” practice is accompanied by widespread “administrative press-
sure” on municipal deputies and by the use of public resources (organizational, logistic, information, and other) to ensure collection of signatures in favor of certain administrative candidates (current heads or deputies), as well as in favor of so-called “technical” candidates who are running to ensure the appearance of competition in elections.

The “municipal filter” apparatus is entirely controlled by the current administration. Instead of being a mechanism of electoral support for candidates for the post of head of region, it is actually a means of political filtration of rivals who are, for one reason or another, unacceptable to regional authorities. The situation is made more dire by the fact that election commissions, judicial and law enforcement bodies, local communities, political parties, the media, public organizations, and the candidates themselves have no effective legal instruments at their disposal with which to oppose this de facto administrative lawlessness.

It is impossible to hold free and competitive elections of heads of the subjects of the Russian Federation while the “municipal filter” is in place. We invite all parties interested in the political process to continue discussing this problem and to initiate a thorough reform of the electoral legislation with the goal of abolishing the existing procedure for collecting signatures of municipal deputies in support of candidates for the elections of heads of regions.

1. Nomination of candidates for the elections of the heads of regions

The final part of the nomination process (i.e. nomination at election commissions) took place without significant problems. There were no reports of obstruction of candidate nomination by election commissions. During this part of the nomination process, candidates did not encounter any major difficulties in preparing the necessary documents, and no complaints were issued about the behavior of election commissions.

However, various data show that the nomination of some candidates from certain political parties (i.e. the initial part of the process) was monitored and aided by the regional authorities and the presidential administration. Local authorities influenced the nomination process in the Republic of Buryatia (in the nomination of a candidate from the Communist Party and, possibly, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)), the Ryazan region (nomination of a candidate from the Communist Party), the Sverdlovsk region (the “Roizman case”), and possibly in other regions as well.

Moreover, the rule that head of region candidates must belong to a political party is, from our point of view, a significant restriction of passive electoral rights (the right to be elected). The lack of a self-nomination option in the SED 2017 elec-
tions (with the exception of the Kirov region, which has a different election law) forces independent regional politicians and public figures to seek formal support from political parties and their regional branches. These politicians, as a rule, enjoy considerable popularity and approval among voters, but are often in conflict with regional authorities or with parts of the regional elite. Because of this, the so-called “systemic” or “parliamentary” parties are extremely reluctant to support such politicians, for fear of spoiling their relations with the regional administrations, and because of the direct reliance of their regional party organizations on state administration bodies and local elite groups. “Small” second and third tier parties, with which local independent opposition figures are forced to negotiate, have no resources to provide effective support for overcoming the “municipal filter.” This additional obstacle – a “party filter” – significantly restricts competition in the gubernatorial elections, and artificially forces local politicians and public figures, who might otherwise successfully run as self-nominees, to seek the endorsement of political parties.

In the 2017 election of the heads of regions, these obstacles led to the failed nominations of the following candidates:

- Konstantin Okunev, businessman and ex-deputy of the legislative assembly, from the party “Cities of Russia”; and Oleg Kharaskin, ex-Minister of Agriculture, from the “Party of the Great Fatherland” in the Perm region;

- Svyatoslav Golubyatnikov, former Deputy Chief of the State Inspectorate, lieutenant colonel of the Airborne Forces, Hero of Russia, from the “Renaissance Party of Russia” in the Ryazan region;

- Yevgeny Roizman, Mayor of Yekaterinburg, from the Yabloko party; and Konstantin Kiselyov, political scientist, deputy of the municipal duma, from “The Greens” in the Sverdlovsk region;

- Oleg Ovchinnikov, participant in the primaries of the “United Russia” party in 2016 and 2017, self-nominee for Izhevsk single-mandate constituency No. 34 in the elections to the State Duma, from the PARNAS Party in the Udmurt Republic;

- Vadim Kolesnichenko, from the “Party of the Great Fatherland” in Sevastopol.

The case of the nomination of Andrei Smyshlyaev, from the Civic Platform party, to the post of the Head of the Republic of Mari El, is an exception to this practice; he is a well-known human rights defender and head of the regional branch of the
Another exception is the nomination of Sergei Balabaev, also from the Civic Platform party, to the post of regional deputy in the Yaroslavl region. Balabaev, who joined PARNAS at the start of the election campaign, has already successfully overcome the “municipal filter.”

The “Golos” movement believes that the nomination of candidates for regional heads from political parties only (and thus the absence of self-nomination opportunities) significantly restricts passive electoral rights and political competition, and contradicts the Constitution.

2. Collecting signatures of heads and deputies of municipalities in support of the nomination of heads of regions

The main problem with the current procedure for electing heads of subjects of the Russian Federation is the so-called “municipal filter.” This mechanism has questionable political usefulness, and is unlikely to benefit the growth of the party and electoral system in the country. As various experts have already vocally expressed, it is unclear how this mechanism of filtering or screening out candidates is at all legitimate from the viewpoint of the Constitution. The politico-administrative techniques of implementing the “municipal filter” rely on coercive “administrative” procedures, abuses, and violations of a criminal nature, which neither the current law, nor the police, nor the electoral system or the legal practice in general, can oppose. [1]

A comparison of the composition of this year’s candidates and the results of the election with those of previous years clearly shows that the “municipal filter” does not serve to screen out candidates and parties who lacked voter support in previous elections. Nor does the mechanism help filter out candidates who are virtually unknown, both to the general public and political experts – unless, that is, the regional administrators have an interest in blocking their nomination. Lastly, in none of this year’s 16 regional election campaigns did the “municipal filter” serve to exclude “technical” candidates, who create artificial competition and have no interest in assuming the duties of the post. At the same time, candidates who could seriously compete with incumbent heads have encountered numerous obstacles. Politicians who did not manage to pass the 2017 “municipal filter” include the previously mentioned Evgeniy Roiyman in the Sverdlovsk region, Svyatoslav Golubyatnikov in the Ryazan region, Konstantin Okunev and Oleg Haraskin in the Perm region, Vadim Kolesnichenko in Sevastopol, Andrew Smyshlyaev in the Republic of Mari El, as well as Vyacheslav Marhaev in the Republic of Buryatia, Anna Cherepanova in the Novgorod region, and Oleg Vinogradov in the Yaroslavl region.

These and many other candidates and parties have cited as the main reason
for the failure of the “municipal filter” the problem of administrative pressure placed on municipal deputies. The goal of that pressure is to obstruct the delivery of signatures in favor of problematic government candidates, as well as to enforce the collection of signatures in favor of incumbent heads of the regions or their “technical” opponents. What is more, this collection of deputies’ signatures often occurred in advance (i.e. before the competitors started collecting signatures) and happened extremely quickly (2-3 days). According to many candidates, members of their campaign staff, and the media and observers, such administrative pressure could have taken place in Buryatia, Kirov, Novgorod, Ryazan, Sverdlovsk, Perm, and Sevastopol.

2.1 Mass collection of signatures in support of administrative candidates and their “technical” rivals

As indicated in a previous statement by “Golos,” the procedure for collecting signatures of municipal deputies in support of candidates for the post of the highest official of the subject of the Russian Federation (i.e. the “municipal filter”) has occasioned diverse, often sharp criticism since the time of its introduction. The election campaign of 2017 further exacerbated this problem due to upgrades in administrative and non-legal manipulation technologies. Certain candidates, for example, abused their right to collect more signatures of municipal deputies than they need, thus making it virtually impossible for other candidates to participate in the election campaign, regardless of the real support they have among voters and political parties.

Based on statements of candidates and reports in the media, we have found that an excessive number of signatures of municipal deputies were collected in the interests of the acting heads and their “technical” rivals in the Republic of Buryatia, the Republic of Karelia, Perm Kirov, Novgorod, Ryazan, and Sverdlovsk regions, and in Sevastopol. These signatures were collected by “administrative candidates” and certified by notaries or heads of settlements, but not presented by candidates when they filed registration documents. Legislation does not place a limit on the number of signatures that candidates are permitted to collect and notarize; it only establishes a 5 percent limit on exceeding the minimum threshold when presenting already collected signatures. Given that certain candidates are able to certify signatures earlier than their competitors, the collection of so-called “secondary” signatures is virtually meaningless. The candidate who decides to pursue the route of “secondary” signatures is entirely dependent on the “goodwill” of candidates who collected the “primary” signatures, that is to say on whether or not they choose to present these signatures (from their huge reserves) to the election commission. This is exactly what happened in the Perm region, the Republic of Buryatia, and the Novgorod region.
Moreover, en masse collection of signatures in the interest of some candidates, especially signatures of deputies of municipal and city districts ("top level" officials), creates insurmountable obstacles for fulfilling the "territorial quota," the obligation to submit signatures from at least 3/4 of upper-level municipalities. To grasp the full consequences of this arrangement, it is necessary to take into account the fact that there are no other municipalities (settlements) on the territories of urban districts. This means that it if one candidate promptly collects the signatures of all or most deputies in just over ¼ of the region's territories, a stalemate ensues in which none of the remaining candidates can fulfill the territorial quota.

A typical example of creating artificial barriers to signature collection by oppositional candidates are the events that took place in the Perm Region. There, the stage of nominating candidates and collecting signatures began on June 10. The provincial governor Maxim Reshetnikov, from the United Russia party, and candidate Andrei Stepanov, from the Patriots of Russia party, were nominated on June 14. On June 15-16, in all districts of the Perm Region there was a simultaneous and en masse collection of signatures in their favor, as evidenced by the signature lists of support for these candidates. According to preliminary estimates made by the headquarters of other candidates, signatures were collected from about 600 top-level deputies out of approximately 800.

Mass collection of signatures of municipal deputies in the Novgorod region took place on July 5-6. By the time the collection of signatures in favor of some candidates had been completed, four of the seven candidates had not yet been nominated.

In the Yaroslavl region, Yabloko party candidate Oleg Vinogradov reported that signatures were collected centrally (i.e. organized and enforced by authorities) in support of four candidates, including the provisional Governor Dmitry Mironov.

In the Republic of Buryatia, the team of candidate Alexei Markhaev (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) declared that the electoral headquarters of the deputy head of the region, Aleksey Tydenov (United Russia), also collected signatures of municipal deputies of the district level in support of the nomination of candidates from the LDPR and the "Communists of Russia" party. Thus, in nine districts (Bountov, Bichursk, Eravninsky, Zaigraevsky, Kizhinginsky, Kurumkansky, Muysk, Mukhorshibirsky, and Tarbagataysky), not a single deputy of the district council could offer his or her signature in support of another candidate.

Statements in which candidates are advised to try to outrun their competitors distort the very idea of the "municipal filter." Collecting deputy signatures should not be a competition or a speed race, but rather a means by which local deputies...
identify individuals they consider worthy candidates to the post of head of the region. The “municipal filter” was conceived as an instrument that would check the amount of actual political support (or lack thereof) behind a candidate, but in reality merely leads to competition for “administrative resources”.

A candidate collecting signatures does not have the opportunity to verify statements made by deputies about whether or not they already signed for his or her competitors, and so must take them at face value. For example, according to the candidate for governor Anna Cherepanova (Novgorod region), “in the Moshen district, several deputies who insisted that they did not give anyone a signature, agreed to give them in support of my candidacy. Then it turned out that the head of the rural settlement had already certified their signatures in favor of another candidate.” Moreover, after the signature lists had been checked and published, some of the deputies denied they had given their signatures in support of certain candidates, or stated that they had been deceived and made to sign for other candidates, or even that they had signed “blank sheets” without a date on them. In addition, there are confirmed cases of mistakes made by notaries or heads of settlement administrations in personal data certification (for example, incorrect indication of the certification date, errors in the full name and date of birth, etc.).

There are also reports that some candidates started collecting signatures before receiving the official permission to begin. As in previous years, MPs were threatened with dismissal, groundless business checks, cancellation of municipal orders, and other punitive measures in the event they fail to sign in support of a particular candidate. In addition, it appears that information about deputies who have signed in favor of a particular candidate is quickly becoming available to the administrations and headquarters of some of the other candidates.

Unfortunately, the current legislation does not allow participants of the political process either to confirm or deny these statements, nor to evaluate reports on the mass collection of deputies’ signatures in favor of one or more candidates.

A key factor that could help ascertain the validity of allegations of mass collection of signatures, as well as establish the reliability of the procedure itself, is the publicity and completeness of notarial documentation. Notaries keep a register and a journal in which they record their actions, including facts of certification of deputies’ signatures. Each record receives a unique registration number. However, this information is not public. Receipts issued by notaries after payment of their services contain the name of the deputy who used the notary service, the date of its implementation, and the number in the notarial register, but not information about the identity of the candidate in favor of whom the signature was delivered.
It is only when we are able to correlate information from notarial registers, journals, receipts, and signature lists, that we will be in the position to assess the full scale of collecting signatures in favor of particular candidates, verify the authenticity of this procedure and the accuracy of notarial acts and statements made by deputies, and verify allegations by candidates about the difficulties they faced in collecting signatures. **Publication of all this information, and not just of the signature lists submitted to the election commission, will allow us to verify allegations of abuse and violation of candidates’ rights.**

In view of the circumstances described above, the “Golos” movement has issued an open statement to the CEC of Russia and the election commissions of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in which the election of senior officials of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation takes place. **We ask that measures be taken to publish the complete lists of heads and deputies of local government who gave notarial support to candidates for governors.**

2.2. Use of “administrative resources” for mass collection of signatures; pressure on heads and deputies of municipalities

Mass-scale collection of signatures of municipal deputies would be impossible without using for this purpose considerable organizational, administrative, logistic, informational and other resources of regional and local administrations, and for which there exists much oral and some documented evidence (see the case regarding the Gainsky district of the Perm region). Often, the organizers of mass-scale signature collections were the heads and employees of local administrations, who were acting according to a pre-compiled schedule, and who delivered deputies to notary offices using official state transport.

According to Anna Cherepanova, a Yabloko party candidate for the governor of the Novgorod region, collection of signatures of municipal deputies took place with grave violations of electoral legislation, including the use of “administrative resources” of the provisional governor Andrei Nik foritin and the government of the Novgorod region. Municipal deputies were pressured by officials of the Government of the Novgorod region, administrations of municipal districts and rural settlements, and members of the party “United Russia” to give signatures for Nikitin and his candidates.

According to the regional branch of the movement, in the first ten days of July, employees of the Government of the Novgorod region, through the heads of rural settlements and employees of district administrations, collected 70-80% of signatures of municipal deputies in support of the nomination of candidates from the parties “United Russia,” the Communist Party, LDPR, “Fair
Russia,” and “Patriots of Russia.” Deputies were forbidden to support the candidate from the Yabloko party, Anna Cherepanova.

In the territories of the region, local administration employees directly supervise signature collection. Signatures were collected simultaneously for candidates from several parties. Some deputies have stated that they had supported other candidates than those for whom they had supposedly given signatures.

Candidates and party organizations in other regions (Permsky Krai, Sverdlovsk Oblast [3]) made similar appeals, including to the Russian president and to law enforcement agencies. The main leitmotif of these statements is that regional and local administrations exerted pressure on municipal deputies and indicated to them who they can and cannot sign for, organized mass collections of signatures in favor of current governors, and assisted in the collection of signatures by candidates from parliamentary parties.

2.3. Other significant problems related to overcoming the “municipal filter”

The situation in the Novgorod region highlighted another problem: the lack of open and public official channels of communication with each of the deputies, especially with the deputies of the settlements. Candidates often lack opportunities to officially and directly address the deputies of settlements and inform them about their nominations. To remedy this situation, they are forced to turn to the heads of settlements. [4]

Another technical problem is that the notary system is not equipped to work in such intense and short time intervals. Signature collection and certification often happens over a period of just a few days.

In the Novgorod region, another obstacle to collecting signatures was the failure to certify signatures of municipal deputies by the heads of the rural settlements of the Demyan and Marevsky municipal districts. In the Marevsky district there is no notary; a notary from the Kholmsky municipal district comes once a week. In some areas of Permsky Krai, notaries suspended reception of citizens and certification of deputies’ signatures for a few days in favor of other candidates, that is until the process of collecting signatures in favor of the head of the region and his technical candidate was completed, and which was accompanied by an organized influx of “signatories” (i.e. deputies).

As a rule, mass collection of signatures of deputies in the interest of the acting heads and their technical rivals ends with helping to collect the remaining signatures for the “parliamentary parties” (specifically the Communist Party, LDPR,
and “Fair Russia”). In some cases, either the heads of the regions themselves or the regional leaders of “United Russia” made proposals to provide such assistance (Tomsk region, Saratov region), or candidates from parliamentary and other parties addressed such requests (Mari El Republic [5], Udmurt Republic [6], Kaliningrad region).

Expert group that authored the report:

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The 2017 “Golos” program for long-term monitoring of elections in support of voters’ rights includes selective monitoring of regional and municipal election campaigns on observation of principles and standards of free and equal democratic elections. Preparing this analytical report, we used information received from long-term observers in 30 regions where “Golos” conducts systematic public observation of the 34 most significant election campaigns. Analysis also included information from other regions, received by the information resource “Map of Violations,” as well as information from the mass media.

“Golos” is guided by internationally accepted election monitoring standards and strictly observes political neutrality, one of the main conditions for independent and objective election observation.

NOTES:

1. In the election of the heads of subjects of the Russian Federation in 2016, such candidates were also not eliminated. For example, in the Komi Republic, Andrei Pyatkov (“Patriots of Russia”) received 2.5% of the votes; in Chechnya, none of the three opponents of the incumbent governor could score even 1%; and the representative of the “Greens,” Lev Levtas, gathered less than 1% in the election of the governor of the Ulyanovsk region. Almost in all other regions where elections were held, there were candidates who did not receive more than 2-3% of the votes.

2. For more information, see the statement by Anna Cherepanova, the Yabloko party candidate for the Novgorod region governor, “On violations of electoral legislation during collection of signatures of municipal deputies in the election of the governor of the Novgorod Region.”
3. Lawyer Ivan Volkov ("Russian National Union"), candidate for the governor of the Sverdlovsk region, wrote a statement to the Investigation Committee about provisional governor Yevgeny Kuyvashev. According to Volkov, Kuyvashev personally prevented him from passing the municipal filter. Volkov published a fragment of his statement to the Committee on Facebook. “In my opinion,” he writes there, “there are grounds to believe that Evgeny Vladimirovich Kuyvashev, candidate for governor of the Sverdlovsk region, probably deliberately committed actions aimed at hindering the free exercise of electoral rights by other candidates for the governor of the Sverdlovsk region.”

4. Anton Morozov (LDPR, Novgorod Region): “Of course, in a certain way, we do use “administrative resources” – in the sense that they [heads of districts] simply help us find these deputies; it’s just physically difficult to find them without help from the heads of districts – [we do not know the deputies’] phone numbers, their addresses, we do not know where they live. [Heads of districts] help us find the deputies and we then explain the essence of our election program to them.”

5. Candidate Nikolai Semyonov from the Green Party reported that they sent a letter to the “United Russian” party signed by the leader of the Green party, Anatoly Panfilov, asking for support.

6. “Kommersant Udmurtia” reported that Timur Yagafarov (LDPR) asked the administration of the head and government of the republic for help collecting signatures.

August 10, 2017, 10:06
Municipal elections in Moscow will take place in 125 city municipalities (124 districts of old Moscow and the urban district of Troitsk). In total, 1,502 seats are to be filled based on the September election results. There are 7,591 registered candidates.

The period of nomination and registration ended in mid-August; it is now election campaign time. However (and as expected), the campaign is being run largely in silence. Local election commissions that organize the elections are not running an appropriate campaign to inform voters about the elections. Regional media, including city television and district newspapers, also continue to pay little attention to the upcoming elections.

In cases where election campaigning is visible in the streets and other areas of the city, it is, as a rule, organized by independent and opposition candidates. In some instances, these candidates face obstacles running their campaigns. At the same time, any election-related scandals and hype about the elections are being nipped in the bud.

“Administrative candidates” – that is, candidates supported by city authorities – prefer to use administrative mobilization networks for their campaign activities from the start of the campaign (in fact, even long before the formal announcement of the elections). They choose this strategy because city administrators adhere to the tactic of restricting the general turnout and mobilizing the so-called “administrative-dependent” electorate.
Conclusions

As expected, current campaigning is mostly taking place under the radar. Most of the election campaigning, as observed in the week before Election Day in the streets and surrounding areas of the city, is being conducted by independent and opposition candidates. These candidates are only occasionally represented on specially designated information stands, billboards, and message boards near residential housing. In some cases, candidates face obstacles when campaigning, but these are currently only sporadic episodes.

Notable are some individual cases of obstruction of legitimate campaign activity, sometimes with the aid of law enforcement. At the same time, the police themselves show little interest in incidents involving damage and destruction of legitimate campaign materials.

Administrative candidates rarely resort to visual outdoor campaigning and prefer to use “administrative mobilization technologies” in their campaign activities. The entire administrative machine, consisting of prefectures of administrative districts, municipal district administrations, and budget organizations, works in their favor.

It is clear that city authorities do not care about turnout in the municipal elections. Moreover, they intend to conduct the so-called “drying” (i.e. reduction) of the general turnout and mobilize the “administratively dependent” electorate. To this end, campaign meetings take place in educational institutions and other budget organizations using the advantages of official positions, thereby violating the requirements and restrictions laid out in the electoral legislation.

At the same time, the very topic of the elections is treated with silence in the media, and the election commissions that organize municipal elections are not overly zealous in informing voters about the election date. In district newspapers, there are extensive reports and information about the administrative activities of administrative candidates and current deputies of municipal assemblies. Meanwhile, in most areas the print versions of regional newspapers are no longer in circulation: they are distributed solely on the Internet.

All scandals and resonant events occurring during the elections are quickly hushed up, once again suggesting that the goal of the authorities is to have a quiet and unremarkable campaign.

During the campaign, instances have occurred in which technology was used to produce indirect campaign effects. These include the “interception” of brands
and slogans of public campaigns, and the manipulation of photographs (images) of candidates on information posters. Both technologies, in our opinion, were used to erode “protest votes” and reduce the electoral advantages of recognizable civil activists who are running as independent and opposition candidates.

**Campaign print materials. A case of obstruction of election campaigning**

There is practically no noticeable campaigning in the streets and other areas of the city. During the entire month of August (the month that accounts for most of the campaign period), there were no traces of electoral advertising on billboards, public transport stops, and street banners. Occasionally, one sees campaigning “cubes” (or “points”) in support of various candidates. Special information stands in residential neighborhoods are dominated by the campaign materials of certain candidates (or teams of candidates running in the same multi-mandate constituency). These are usually self-nominees, candidates from the Communist Party, LDPR, and Yabloko. A similar situation has been observed with regard to campaign print materials (hereinafter: CPMs) distributed to mailboxes.

*Moscow, Krasnoselsky district*
Recently, sporadic incidents of removal of CPMs belonging to independent candidates have been reported. In the Krasnoselsky district, deliberate damage was done to CPMs posted in support of the team of candidates of the Solidarity movement, and one of the information stands was dismantled. The disappearance of campaign stands was reported in other regions as well (for example, the Khamovniki region).

There have been several cases of removal of candidates’ campaign materials from bulletin boards near residential houses and from official information stands. In the Veshnyaki district, for instance, an unidentified young man deliberately removed fresh campaign materials from information stands. In the South Butovo region, unexpectedly and on the orders of the leadership of the GBI “Zhilischnik,” all the candidates’ campaign materials were removed from the official information stands. It is alarming that such reports became more frequent two weeks before Election Day, when election campaigning, as a rule, is in the most intensive stage.

It should be noted that “deliberately destroying or damaging information material related to elections, referendums, or campaign materials placed in accordance with the law, posted on a building, structure, or other object during an election campaign or referendum campaign, or making inscriptions or images on such material” (Code of Administrative Offenses) carries a punishment in the form of a fine in the amount of 500-1500 rubles (Article 5.14 of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation). Yet the police, who are in charge of these administrative cases, are often inactive and do not pay attention to such offenses.

There have been reported cases of exerting pressure on candidates in order to hinder their campaign activities. For example, in Troparevo-Nikulino, a candidate from Yabloko, Andrei Safonov, met with resistance from six young people of a sportive look and athletic build while exercising his election campaign rights. There is a suspicion that their actions were coordinated by the candidate from “Fair Russia,” Alexander Mikhailovsky, deputy head of the regional Council of Deputies.

In the aforementioned area, Krasnoselsky police detained self-nominated candidate Petr Tsarkov. He was accused of “campaigning against the authorities.” He was soon released from the police department without a protocol. Candidates from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation were detained in the Nekrasovka area for participating in an “uncoordinated picket.”

We should remember that in early September, a week before Election Day, the density and regularity of campaign events should increase. Accordingly, efforts to obstruct legitimate election campaigning, including involvement of law enforcement agencies, might also increase.
At the end of August, some administrative districts of the city witnessed the participation of “administrative candidates” in street and apartment campaigning, which is not typical for Moscow elections. On August 30, in Losinoostrovsky district, at one of the meetings of the candidates from United Russia with the electorate, there was an attack on a resident of the district, and, simultaneously, on a candidate from the Party of Growth, Andrei Ulinkin.

So far, sporadic cases of campaign obstruction targeting candidates in Moscow cannot be characterized as a systemic phenomenon; they take place against the backdrop of massive and organized use of official positions and “administrative resources.” Publicized obstruction cases are atypical and can partly be explained by the initiatives of competing candidates or excessive “diligence” by law enforcement agencies. However, the most active phase of the campaign is yet to come. It will begin in September, after the end of the “holiday season,” and the relatively calm course of the campaign might change.

Territorial election commissions that organize municipal elections do not prevent candidates from carrying out their election campaigning. For candidates, the problem is how to finance the production of campaign materials using their electoral accounts, as there are restrictions on the amount of donations they can receive. Part of the campaign materials, as a rule, is printed on the candidates’ own equipment, which is not prohibited by law.
In this context, there is an unsurprising scarcity of reports on the production and distribution of illegal printed materials without payment from the election fund or without specifying the necessary output data. A report on illegal campaigning in the Northern Tushino area came from the “Map of Violations” resource, where a self-nominee candidate, Anatoly Gutman, personally distributed his incorrectly drafted campaigning materials. There was also a report on an incident in the Solntsevo district where unregistered campaign materials were distributed by a team of candidates from United Russia. There are similar reports from the other districts of Moscow.

“Administrative resource”: use of advantages of official positions and infringement on the equality of candidates’ rights during election campaigning

Campaign materials of administrative (pro-governmental) candidates on street stands and in other areas are rare. And this is not accidental. Administrations, general schools, medical institutions, social service centers, councils of veterans, and other budget organizations are involved in “quiet” campaigning for administrative candidates. It is common knowledge that electoral legislation prohibits the use of the official (service) advantages for purposes of election campaigning. The electoral legislation also envisages the creation and observance of conditions for equal access of candidates and parties to public funds, including premises in state and municipal ownership.

As usual, there is campaigning among disabled and elderly people who have social workers attached to them. From the Don district came a report that people were forced to participate in campaigning activities in support of administrative candidates. A mother of a disabled child reported that she was under serious pressure. The woman was told that if she didn’t go to meetings with the candidate from United Russia, she would no longer receive disability benefits for her children.

In the city of Troitsk, social services issued to the elderly a list of the “right.” The pensioners perceived this as instructions on how to vote.

There are a lot of reports about calls to voters from schools and hospitals. Employees of these institutions are inviting voters to meetings with administrative candidates.

For example, in the Khovrino district, principal of school No. 597, Elena Zaitseva, gathered the parents from the second multi-mandate electoral district and cam-
Campaigned for them to come out on September 10 and vote for the candidate from United Russia, acting deputy Iryna Godovikova, who works at this school.

The principal of school No. 1474, also in the Khovrino district, Irina Kurtkatina, who is also the acting municipal deputy and a United Russia candidate in the third constituency, organized a meeting with voters right in her office. In the same district, the head of the administration openly campaigned to parents of schoolchildren to vote for administrative candidates.

In the Lomonosov district, senior educator Olesya Sonjushkina, from the kindergarten “Olenyonok” (which belongs to school No. 117) campaigning at a parents’ meeting to “show a civil position” in favor of the administrative candidate – the school’s director, Irina Baburina, and the whole team running for deputies with her.

It should be stressed that the law on education prohibits pedagogical workers from using educational activities for political campaigning, while the law on political parties prohibits parties from interfering in the educational process of educational institutions. Parental meetings are considered a part of educational activity; therefore, it is forbidden to use them for the purposes of political campaigning. In addition, such campaign meetings are organized using the advantages of official positions, which is also prohibited by the electoral legislation.

There are complaints from employees of the public sector that they are being forced to engage in political campaigning. For example, a nurse in a clinic in the Donskoy district campaigned during official hours in support of her clinic’s leader. At the same time, she complained to a voter that she was forced to do this.

The premises of state and municipal bodies, as well as public associations, are often used for campaigning for administrative candidates. For example, there was a campaign poster of the candidate for the first district from United Russia – the head the branch, Marina Rybakova – next to the entrance to the Social Services Center of the Southern Medvedkovo district. Other campaign materials supporting Rybakova were posted inside the center. In this case, there is clear evidence of the use of an official position for campaign purposes, as well as evidence of violation of the principle of candidate equality.

In Zelenograd, the staff of the Center for Social Services campaigned for a group of candidates and distributed campaign materials on the premises of the Center. In the Tsaritsino district, campaign materials were distributed in polyclinic No. 62.
In the Dorogomilovo district, the premises of the Council of Veterans were used to campaign for certain candidates. On July 14, there was a campaign meeting with self-nominated candidate Vyacheslav Ninichenko, who is running in the third district, in a room allocated by the city for the activities of the Veterans’ Council. In the room, there were newspapers with images and interviews of candidates, which were distributed as campaign materials. In addition, local residents reported that self-nominated candidate Stanislav Kovalov also conducts campaign events there.

Similar “administrative” technologies have previously been used in Moscow on a large scale. What is remarkable about these elections is that such technologies are now being used in advance and on a large scale from the very beginning of the election campaign.

It is reasonable to expect that the lack of information about the elections in the media and the absence of resonant events should lead to a lower overall turnout, and that the use of the so-called “administrative-dependent” electorate through “administrative” resources will give the necessary number of votes for the victory of administrative candidates.

Campaigning in the mass media

There is an expected and evident preference for “administrative” candidates or current deputies in district newspapers. For example, in the last four months in the Danilovsky district, the newspaper “Danilovsky Vestnyk” has significantly increased the number of articles about active deputies who are running for re-election on the “administrative list.” For instance, over the past four months there were five articles dedicated to Tatyana Rodionova, acting deputy and candidate for the third district from United Russia. Five more articles were published about the current deputy from LDPR and the current candidate from United Russia, Sergei Rublev.

During the election campaign, there was significantly more information about the activities of the ZiL Cultural Center (Moscow Automotive Society – Likhachov Plant), whose director, Elena Melvil, is running on the list of United Russia. For comparison, Tamara Pomozova, acting deputy and self-nominated candidate from the “Party of Growth” for the first district, had just one article published about her in four months.

In the same newspaper, one can also find references to one of the parties that has a list of running candidates in these elections.
This is a typical situation for most areas of Moscow. However, it is important to note that since 2015, in most areas, printed versions of regional newspapers have been discontinued. Newspapers are now mostly distributed online; there are associated groups in social networks (for example, “Danilovsky Vestnik”). However, the popularity of such groups and websites of district newspapers is minimal (the campaign articles get only a few dozen views). Thus, it is unlikely that this advantage of “administrative” candidates will have a significant electoral effect.

At the time of writing of this report, we did not notice systematic election campaigning in the newspapers of the prefectures of the administrative districts of Moscow, which are distributed free of charge in paper form.

The planned hushed nature of the campaign

Individual attempts “from below,” at the district level, to remove independent or opposition candidates are blocked “from above.” For example, on August 18, the Moscow City Court partially reinstated candidates from Yabloko in the Sokol district, who were unlawfully removed by a district court.

But the most striking example is the situation in the Koptevo district, where in late August the chairman of the territorial election commission filed a lawsuit for the removal of a team of opposition candidates from the Communist Party and Yabloko party in the second electoral district. On August 28, the Koptevo District Court of Moscow – where, it should be noted, the plaintiff used to work – granted the dismissal. Candidates were found guilty of abuse of the freedom of mass media due to the fact that leaflets with their biographies appeared on advertising stands near residential buildings. The reaction at the city level was very fast. The prosecutor’s office filed an appeal, which the Moscow City Court hastily satisfied, returning candidates to the election race. At the same time, the Moscow City Election Commission removed the chairman of the territorial election commission from the post of chairman and forced him to file an application for resignation as a member of the commission.

At the same time, any negative statements regarding the status of documents submitted by “administrative candidates” at the nomination stage are being suppressed. In the Golovinsky district, for example, there is a dispute about the registration of a candidate from United Russia, Nadezhda Arkhiptsova, who did not disclose a previous conviction in her application. Her registration was disputed by another candidate, but then the information about Arkhiptsova’s criminal record suddenly appeared on the official website of the election commission, and the commission itself announced that it was in possession of all the documents absent during registration.
The described cases of suppressing scandals and resonant events demonstrate a plan and intention for a hushed election campaign.

Other technologies related to campaigning

A notable example of the technological approach used in Moscow, and which has an indirect campaign effect, is the “interception” of protest brands and manipulation of photographs on information posters.

One way to “intercept” a brand or a slogan might look like this: before the election, one of the existing non-profit organizations is renamed – either the name (slogan) of a socially important topic is included in the new name, or a name with a high degree of similarity to the name of a district public association. After that, such a brand can be used in the campaign materials of “spoiler candidates” (candidates meant to undermine specific candidates) or “technical candidates” (those who do not intend to take the post even if elected), and whose task is to distort the votes for non-administrative candidates. At the same time, there is usually no active campaigning on the part of “spoiler candidates.” However, the use of “stolen” brands can play a significant role on Election Day.

The story of the “We Are Against Renovation” brand is indicative of this phenomenon, because candidates supporting it suddenly appeared in the districts of Kapotnya, Severnoye Izmaylovo, and Timiryazevsky. An organization with this name was created by renaming the “Public Organization for Families with Disabled Children – Pulse,” in the Kapotnya Municipal District, headed by Elena Kolesnikova, a municipal deputy from United Russia in the Kapotnya District. It is important to stress that Northern Izmailovo and Timiryazevsky districts are areas where active and well-known participants and organizers of the actual movement against the law on renovation – Yulia Galyamina and Ekaterina Vinokurova – live.

A similar situation occurred with the renaming of the regional children’s non-governmental organization “Knockdown Karate,” which until 2016 was headed by a deputy from United Russia in the district of Lublino. The organization was renamed “We Are Against Paying for Parking.”

In the Dorogomilovo district, there suddenly appeared a registered organization named “Public Council Dorogomilovo,” whose name caused considerable confusion because it closely resembles the name of a well-known protest group in the district. Prior to renaming, “Public Council Dorogomilovo” was a regional youth public organization named “Sports and Patriotic Association “School of Courage”.”
The technology of “intercepting” a brand is more effective in cases where less information about candidates is available to the voter. And this point is not lost on the city authorities. **Immediately before the elections, the city adopted a law reducing the information on candidates required for inclusion on an information poster in the voting premises.** Under the new rules, such posters should contain “not less” information than in the ballot, namely: last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth, place of residence and occupation, the name of the association that nominated the candidate, and criminal record information. In particular, images (photos) of candidates were excluded from the list of necessary information.

Some voters prefer to make their choice after arriving to the voting station. Such voters largely make their choice based on information on candidates displayed on information posters. **It is to be assumed that the exclusion of photographs would reduce electoral advantages of independent and opposition candidates from among the recognizable district civil activists.** In addition, such a presentation of candidate information obscures the unhealthy age difference between administrative and independent candidates.

As of August 31, decisions on the content of information posters were published in 76% of all territorial commissions (95 out of 125). Among these 95 municipalities, only in 46% of cases did photographs remain on the posters.

Looking at the geographical distribution of areas where the photographs remained and where they were removed from the lists, we can note a strong correlation in some administrative districts. It is especially strong in the Central and Southern administrative districts of Moscow, where at the moment there is not a single area with photographs on posters. This once again confirms our assumption that the headquarters of administrative candidates coordinate at the prefectural level with administrative districts.
Picture: Map of Moscow according to the project MCEC-aggregator on August 31. Green color: areas where posters have photographs. Red: areas where posters do not have photographs. Dark gray: areas without elections (New Moscow, except the Troitsk and Shchukino districts). Gray: areas where election commission decisions on the content of information posters have not been published.

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03-Sep-2017, 18:19*
The Human Rights Centre “Memorial” has been keeping lists of Russian political prisoners for several years.

The term “political prisoner” that we use is based on the PACE Resolution No. 1900 (2012). These are, firstly, cases that can be described by referring to the term “prisoner of conscience”, that is when criminal prosecution or deprivation of liberty was used solely because of political, religious or other convictions, and also because of the non-violent exercise of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Secondly, there are cases of political persecution for political reasons carried out in violation of the right to a fair trial, other rights and freedoms guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, with a clear violation of the law, selectively, inadequately to public danger or on the basis of falsification of evidence of guilt.

At the same time, we exclude from the category of political prisoners persons who used violence against someone or called for violence based on race, religion, ethnicity, etc. This exclusion, of course, does not mean that we consider persecution of such persons to be undoubtedly justified and legitimate or that we approve such persecution.

In addition, the lists of political prisoners are obviously incomplete, as they include only those people whose cases could have been analysed and evaluated for compliance with our criteria. For various reasons, especially due to secrecy of cases concerning espionage, high treason and often also terrorism, many criminal prosecutions that seem to have signs of illegality and political motivation could not be included in the current list.

Since 2016, considering the large number of cases of criminal prosecution connected to realization of the right to freedom of religion and religious affiliation, which concerns primarily, but not exclusively Muslims, we publish two lists: a list of persons deprived of liberty in connection with realization of the right to freedom of religion and religious affiliation and a list of all other political prisoners.
Under the notion of “deprivation of liberty”, we understand also detention in prisons or in psychiatric institutions on the basis of a court verdict, pre-trial detention or house arrest before sentencing. Thus, outside our statistics there remains a huge array of criminal political repressions which are unrelated to imprisonment at the given moment.

The lists of political prisoners of the HRC “Memorial” should be thus regarded as a minimal conservative estimate of the number of political prisoners in Russia and only an indicator of the level of political repression in general. Overall, the number of political prisoners is likely to exceed two to three times the number registered by the Memorial Human Rights Centre. Nevertheless, these lists provide an opportunity to get an idea of the situation and trends.

On September 10, 2017, 49 people were on the list of political prisoners (excluding those persecuted in connection with the realization of the right to freedom of religion and religious affiliation), whereas on the “religious” list there were 71 people, which sums up to a total of 120 people.

![Diagram 1](image)

We can see that during the last years the amount of political prisoners has been steadily increasing. This growth occurs through persons imprisoned by reason of realization of the right to freedom of religion while the amount of other political prisoners stays more or less stable.

A year ago there were 50 people in the “non-religious” list of the political prisoners, the total amount of political prisoners was 100 people, two years ago – 35 and 45 people.
In general, taking into account those who were released, the amount of political prisoners in Russia during the last year is 68 people in the “non-religious” list and 77 people in the “religious” one, 145 people in total have been included to the lists of Memorial.

During the last year, since September 2016, 20 people from the “non-religious” list were released (four of them were included to the list during this year). Nine of them (A. Bubeev, A. Gaskarov, A. Izokaitis, D. Ishevskii, I. Nepomnyaschikh, L. Razvozzhaev, S. Reznik, A. Sutuga and S. Udaltsov) fully served their terms, two – (T. Osipova and L. Tikhonov) were released on parole, one – (A. Moroshkin) was released after the involuntary commitment, for three – imprisonment before sentencing was canceled (N. Sharina, R. Sokolovskiy, I. Zhitenev), three – (O. Sevastidi, A. Kesyan, M. Dzhan-dzhgava) were pardoned, sentences against two of them (I. Dadin, I. Stenin) were canceled.

Unfortunately, 15 people were added to the list during the same period.

Dmitriy Borisov, Stanislav Zimovets, Dmitriy Krepkin, Yuriy Kuliy, Alexey Politikov, Alexandr Shpakov were sentenced to different terms of pre-trial and correctional imprisonment allegedly accused of violence towards policemen during a peaceful protest against corruption which was held on March 26, 2017. Persecution of these people is a part of the intimidation trend towards participants of peaceful demonstrations. The same trend could be clearly observed during “Bolotnaya Square case”, two figurants of which (Maksim Panfilov and Dmitriy Buchenkov) are still imprisoned, Buchenkov is repressed contrary to the obvious evidence of his absence at the Bolotnaya Square on May 6, 2012. Tatar activist Danis Safargali was accused of incitement to hatred and enmity for publication and sharing of posts in social networks which contained the criticism of Russian authorities. Earlier we had recognized as political prisoners people who had been sentenced to imprisonment in similar cases: Rafis Kashapov, Ayrat Dilmuhametov, Robert Zagreev, Darya Polyudova, Alexey Kungurov, Vadim Tyumentsev, Vitaliy Shishkin. These repressions aim to suppress freedom of expression of Russian citizens.

Kirill Barabash and Valeri Parfenov were sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment, Alexandr Sokolov – to 3.5 years of imprisonment being accused in “organizing of an extremist organization activity” for propaganda of the idea of a referendum, which is definitely not related to incitement to violence.

Zhalaudi Geriev, an independent journalist, has been serving a 3-year prison term on absurd accusation of drug storage.
The persecution of Dmitriy Bogatov, who is now under house arrest, encroaches upon the freedom of information dissemination. He is accused of incitement to terrorism and mass riots despite the fact that Bogatov has had nothing to do with this incitement, he is just a person who has maintained on his computer an exit node of the Tor network.

77-year-old scientist Vladimir Latypin was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment for “treason” – legal exchange of scientific information with Chinese colleagues. Inga Tutisani, an unemployed from Krasnodar Krai, was also accused of treason and sentenced to 6-year prison term for sending 2 text messages about Russian warships, which she had seen in Abkhazia from a bus window, to a Georgian citizen. Latypin and Tutisani are the victims of the “spy-mania” which aims to maintain the course of Russian propaganda about Russia in the circle of enemies.

Alexey Nikonorov, policeman, has become a victim of Russian state’s fight with electoral rights of its citizens. He was sentenced to 3 years and 7 months of prison on unproven accusation in bribery, abuse of power and illegal access to computer information for giving an opportunity to an opposition politician to check reliability of signatures which were collected for nomination of the list of candidates for deputies.

Maksim Smyshlyaev was sentenced to a 10-year prison term unreasonably accused of aiding to prepare an unfulfilled act of terrorism. His persecution was used for strengthening of anti-Ukrainian hysteria by Russian propaganda. The same motivation can be met in criminal cases of Ukrainian citizens Stanyslav Klykh and Mykola Karpyuk (they were sentenced to 20 and 22.5 years of imprisonment on absurd accusation in participation in hostilities in Chechnya), Oleg Sentsov and Alexandr Kolchenko (sentenced to 20 and 10 years on false accusation in terrorism), Sergey Litvinov (sentenced to 8.5 years on far-fetched accusation in robbery in Donbas region), Andrey Kolomiets and Alexandr Kostenko (they serve their terms for participation in the Revolution of Dignity in Maidan, Kyiv), Akhtem Chiygoz (sentenced to 8 years of prison for organizing in Crimea, a demonstration against the occupation and annexation). The attributes of the same political motivation can be found in cases of Roman Suschenko, Alexey Sizonovytch, Pavlo Gryb, Valentyn Vyhivskiy, Viktor Schur, but we have no access to their case documents.

Yuriy Dmitriev, human rights activist, the head of Memorial in Karelia who had spent dozens of years on Stalin’s repressions’ victims commemoration, was detained falsely accused of child pornography production. In this case, as in many others, we can find coherence of local authorities’ interest and the interest of state propaganda, the first aims to stop the activity of human rights defenders, the second – to defame them.
Sergey Reznikov, an activist who protected the rights of Moscow inhabitants from dishonest developers, for the convenience of local authorities was sentenced to 3 years of prison falsely accused of drug possession.

Even this overview of the political prisoners’ cases, which have been added to Memorial lists during the last year, detects selective nature of political repressions. From the one hand, they are aimed at demonstrative suppression of the citizens’ rights for the freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and information dissemination, other constitutional rights. From the other hand, usually an important motivation for repressions is an aspiration to strengthen the propaganda with criminal cases. There are cases in which the main obvious motivation of persecution is stopping legal activity of a civic activist. This motivation goes together with the interests of the particular policeman, investigator, prosecutor and FSB official in their career growth and their corporation’s success. In fact, the dependence of the judicial branch from the executive power ensures conviction towards people persecuted on political reasons in most cases.

Dozens of Russian Criminal code articles appears the instruments of politically motivated imprisonment. Persecution of political prisoners from our the last year list has been conducted using 45 articles of the Criminal code.

The ratio of different Criminal code articles used for politically motivated imprisonments can be found on the Diagram 2 (excluding cases of people persecuted by reason of realization of the right to freedom of religion).

![Diagram 2](image-url)
Most often, in 23 cases, there were used articles related to public events (mass riots, violent actions against a public authority) due to mass character of “Bolotnaya Square case”\(^1\) and the case of March 26\(^2\). In 21 cases, mostly linked with publishing posts on the Internet, the group of “extremist” articles were used. In 13 cases criminal proceedings were instituted based on accusation in murder, bodily harm, beatings, 12 cases – connected with terrorism, 10 cases – mercenary crimes, 8 cases – treason, 6 cases – connected with weapons, 5 cases – with drugs. 12 more articles were used in 1-3 cases.

The first two positions can be easily explained as street protests and free Internet is seen by the authorities as the main threats which should be combated with criminal repressions. Besides, especial indistinctness of the “anti-extremist” legislation allows to interpret the law as widely as possible with the help of experts who are ready to justify anything.

In general, this diversity of false accusation in politically motivated criminal cases obstructs the possibility to get an overall perception and necessitate us to analyze every case carefully. The law enforcement authorities often add some falsified but pure criminal accusation to a falsified but politically motivated one trying to make the case more convincing (A. Kostenko was accused in weapons storage, A. Kolomiets – in drug storage, D. Safargali allegedly participated in a fighting).

Another compilation of the Criminal code articles is used for imprisonment by reason of realization of the right to freedom of religion and religious affiliation (Diagram 3).

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\(^1\) The mass rally on May 6, 2012, organized in Moscow by movement for free and fair elections at the day before the inauguration of Vladimir Putin and finished with the mass detentions. As it was analyzed by the independent civic group of the investigators, the riots were provoked by the police corps by stopping the participants from entering the officially agreed venue of the rally, switching off the microphones and arrests of the key speakers of the rally.

\(^2\) The mass rally against corruption organized by the Alexej Navalny followers in many Russian cities on March 26, 2017.
More than a half of these political prisoners are accused of participation in “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami” (“Islamic Party of Liberation”). Russia is the only country in the world which considers this organization as a terrorist one for no reason. Institution of a criminal case which can end with a 10-20-year prison term is not even difficult. Participation in a discussion of the political-religious doctrine, not associated with preparation to any actions, is enough to get a conviction. It clarifies the mass character of “terrorist” articles used against the political prisoners from the “religious” list (40% of cases).

Besides, in the last few years we can observe more and more often the following: a person accused of participation in “Hizb ut-Tahrir” which refuses to admit guilt or cooperate with the investigators can be also charged with preparation to a violent overthrow of the constitutional order. It is remarkable that this accusation never relates to certain actions but it is based solely on the analysis of the theoretical Hizb ut-Tahrir doctrine. 21% of such accusations are explained specifically by this point.

19% of cases with weapons manufacturing and storage are linked with a case of a group of 15 Muslims who, as we suppose, were imprisoned for allegedly preparing an act of terrorism without any reason. Weapons and explosives were planted by the authorities who conducted the search.

The rest 20% of cases are related with the “extremist” Criminal code articles. These articles have been used to persecute followers of Turkish theologian Nursi and, since 2017, Jehovah’s Witnesses (one of them, a citizen of Denmark Dennis Kristensen is detained).

It can be assumed that the motivation of repressions by reason of realization of the right to freedom of religion and religious affiliation are the following: the aspiration to prove the existence of a real terrorist threat, demonstrative “fighting against international terrorism”, suppression of independent associations which pose no danger (used not only toward religious groups), interests of the corporations (law enforcement agencies still have to demonstrate the statistics as the main criterion of their work). In some cases we can suppose that there is also a motivation to stop legal civic activity of the objects of the persecution (Rustem Latypov, human rights defender; and activist Linar Vakhitov, were accused of participation in Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bashkortostan).

We should also highlight the accusation of people from Crimea in Hizb ut-Tahrir participation. In Ukraine this organization is completely legal, persecution of its members in Crimea is an additional pressure tool pointed at Crimean Tatars. Currently, there are 4 sentenced people from Crimea in the Memorial “religious” list: Ruslan Zeytullaev, Ferat Sayfullaev, Rustem Vaitov, Yuriy (Nuri) Primov, but lots of similar cases are still being examined.
Assessing the trends of politically motivated imprisonment, we should note the increase of imprisoned by reason of realization of the right to freedom of religion and religious affiliation and also toughening of this kind of repressions.

The estimation by the average length of a prison term is arbitrary but it may be taken as an indicator.

A year ago the average length of a political prisoner’s term from the “non-religious” list was about 5 years and 3 months (excluding two people sentenced for life imprisonment), now it is about 6 years and 2 months. The situation with people from the “religious” list is even worse: the average length of term has grown from 6 years and 7 months to 8 years and 7 months.

Last year’s practice demonstrates that mass public pressure put on Russian authorities can bring some results, at least in the most flagrant cases of politically motivated persecution.

During this period:

- Anti-constitutional article 212.1 of the Criminal code, which penalize “repeated violation of the order of organizing or conducting a public event”, was notably disavowed by the Constitutional Court;

- The sentence which was passed on Ildar Dadin based on this article was canceled;

- The sentence which was passed on Igor Stenin was canceled (Stenin was accused of incitement to extremism for a comment in a social network made by some other person);

- YouTube-blogger Ruslan Sokolovskiy (accused of incitement to hatred and insulting the feelings of believers) and Natalia Sharina, director of a library (accused of incitement to hatred for storage of books in the library stock), were sentenced to conditional terms;

- Accused of treason O. Sevastidi, A. Kesyan, M. Dzhandzhgava from Krasnodar Krai were pardoned (they had sent text messages to Georgia);

- Criminal persecution of Valentina Cherevatenko accused of evasion of “foreign agent’s” duties based on anti-constitutional Criminal code article 330.1 was canceled.

Nearly all of these cases were accompanied with civil campaigns in Russia and campaigns of putting pressure on Russian authorities from abroad. It can be assumed that they influenced the result.
These instruments of international putting pressure can be considered appropriate for future actions:

- Special attention to the cases of politically motivated criminal persecution in Russia, particularly to political prisoners’ cases;

- Constant requests to release people who have been imprisoned based on obviously falsified accusations and / or solely because of their political, religious or other beliefs, as well as non-violent exercise of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and information, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and other rights and freedoms guaranteed by international obligations of Russia;

- Constant requests to repeal the anti-constitutional and violating international obligations of Russian criminal laws: article 212.1 of the Criminal code, article 284.1 of the Criminal code and all the amendments in legislation which have established the concept of “undesirable organizations”, article 330.1 of the Criminal code and all the amendments in legislation which have established the concept of “organizations which function as a foreign agent”, article 282.1 of the Criminal code;

- Constant requests to concretize and narrow the legislative definition and practice of law-enforcement activities on “extremist activity” and articles 280, 282, 282.1, 282.2, 282.3 of the Criminal code.

- Imposing personal sanctions on people who bear responsibility for flagrant violations of human rights related to illegal politically motivated imprisonment.

Learn more about the situation with political repressions and political prisoners in Russia at Memorial HRDC web-site https://memohrc.org/#programs/40 (available in English). Write an e-mail to press@memohrc.org if you would like to receive news e-mails on the topic in Russian or English.
“The right to freedom of assembly... is a keystone of a democratic society”\(^1\). The truth of this statement made by European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter - ECHR) is best demonstrated by the court’s statistics. Starting from 1961, when the court in Strasbourg completed the review of the first individual application, ECHR issued approximately 140 decisions and statements concerning, in one way or another, the violations of human right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Only 19 out of 47 country-members of Council of Europe are now covered by this case law and violations of right to freedom of assembly was established after only 109 trials concerning 14 countries.

On such a generally favorable background, the fact that Russia with 16 relevant regulations issued by ECHR (9 of which were issued after 01.01.2016) confidently and most likely for long takes its place among three countries which are together responsible for the two thirds of cases of violation of the right to freedom of assembly in the countries of Council of Europe cannot be ignored. This sad situation can be explained by considerable and unproportioned limitations of this right brought by legislative and executive branches of Russian state authority on the one hand, and on the other hand, by the lack of an efficient judicial protection of this right on the national level.

The constant attention of Russian human rights activists to this problem intensified in 2012. That year the government used public disorders, caused by its own actions and which ended large protest rally on May, 6\(^{th}\) at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, to bring radical and anti-democratic changes to the legislation concerning freedom of peaceful assembly.

First of all, the administrative responsibility of the organizers and participants of public gatherings has been increased significantly. On June, 9\(^{th}\) 2012 the minimal administrative fine for violation of public events legislation, stated in the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses (hereinafter - CRFAO) was raised from 1.000 rubles to 10.000 rubles for individuals, and the maximum fine was raised from 2.000 rubles to 300.000 rubles (which equaled 7.421 EUR at the time the law was passed and equals approximately 4.259 EUR at the moment).

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\(^1\) See the decision of ECHR for the case DjavitAn v. Turkey, no. 20652/92, § 56.
At the same time, the total number of offenses for which participants of peaceful assemblies could be persecuted stated in CRFAO was increased from 4 to 10. For some of these offenses mandatory work was introduced as a new form of punishment and also the limitation period for bringing to responsibility for violation of the legislation on public events increased from 3 months from the date of committing an administrative offense to 1 year.

In parallel, a number of anti-democratic changes has been made to the Federal Law “On Assemblies, Rallies, Demonstrations, Processions and Picketing” (hereinafter - the Federal Law on Assemblies) which in turn made organizing and carrying out public events more difficult. Particularly, the responsibility for any harm caused by event’s participants was laid on the organizer of the event; an absolute ban was issued on using face-masks or other means of disguise which obstructs identification by the event's participants; individuals who have an uncleaned or unpaid conviction for committing an intentional crime against the foundations of the constitutional order and state security or crimes against public security and public order were included to the list of citizens who cannot be the organizers of the event; the previously issued ban on carrying out an assembly at the nighttime began to operate not from 23:00 local time, but from 22:00. The federal legislators also delegated to the parliaments of the subjects of the Russian Federation additional powers to limit public events. In fact, with the help of these new powers, directly or indirectly, it became possible on a regional level to deprive the citizens of the right to choose freely the place for carrying out any socio-political action except one-person picketing.

It is worth noting as a positive fact that on February 14th, 2013, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation issued an order No. 4-P, in which it was stated that the minimum administrative penalties established in various parts of Article 20.2 of CRFAO unduly limit the property rights of citizens, which contradicts constitution of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the Constitutional Court indicated that the Russian parliament should make the necessary changes to the legal regulation of the minimum penalties for the relevant administrative offenses and before such a change of legislation, the Constitutional Court allowed the courts of general jurisdiction to reduce the penalties below the limit set in CRFAO. However, in practice the courts of general jurisdiction use this opportunity very rarely even for the cases in which formal violations of the law by a participant of a peaceful assembly were minimal and did not cause any socially dangerous outcomes.

In the meantime, the introduction of anti-democratic changes in the Russian legislation in the field in question continued.

In 2013, amendments were made to the Federal Law “On Basic Guarantees of the Rights of the Child in the Russian Federation”. The norm that had been in effect
since 1999 and which, among measures to protect the rights of the child in the implementation of activities in the field of his/her education, provided for the right of students and pupils of educational institutions to hold meetings and rallies outside the academic hours to protect their violated rights, on the territory and in the premises of an educational institution, was excluded from the law.

The repressive component of the Federal Law on Assemblies was strengthened in 2014 after the well-known events on Independence Square in Kiev, when a wave of protest actions swept across Russia as a response to the policy of the Russian authorities towards Ukraine.

In July 2014, a new article 212.1 was introduced into the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter - the Criminal Code), which established criminal liability for “repeatedly violating the established procedure for organizing or holding a meeting, rally, demonstration, procession or picketing.” For the citizens who were brought to administrative responsibility more than twice in 6 months under Article 20.2 of the CRFAO and at the same time committed another violation of the Federal Law on Assemblies², the penalty in the form of imprisonment for up to 5 years or a fine of up to 1.000.000 rubles was introduced. The maximum fine suggested equaled 21.030 EUR at the time the law was passed and equals approximately 14.198 EUR at the moment.

Along with this the Article 20.2 of the CRFAO itself was toughened: it was supplemented by two new offenses. Part 6.1 of the article implemented liability for participation “in unauthorized assembly, rally, demonstration, procession or picketing” which caused disturbance in the work of transportation or social infrastructure, communication, problems in the movement of pedestrians and/or transport or obstacles to the access of citizens to living quarters and other infrastructure facilities. In this case, it is impossible not to notice the controversial use of the term “unauthorized public event”, which is in disagreement with the rest of Russian legislation, formally still providing a notifying and not permissive procedure for organizing public events. At the same time the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, considering the notion of “authorization process”, indicated that it presupposes the right of the authority to propose to the organizer of a public event a different place or time of its holding, motivating such restriction with an exhaustive legislative list of grounds affecting the safety of life, health and normal functioning of the citizens³.

² The use of this rule of the Criminal Code for suppressing opposition protests stalled after the Constitutional Court, in its Decision No. 2-P of February 10th, 2017, indicated the mandatory conditions for its application, which entailed the complete justification of Ildar Dadin, previously convicted by the sentence of the Basmanny District Court of Moscow from December 7, 2015 under Article 212.1 of the Criminal Code to two years and six months of imprisonment.
³ See the definition of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of January 29th, 2015 No. 201-0.
The second newly added offense (Part 8) provides for liability in case of re-committing during one year one of the administrative offenses the formal composition of which is described in other parts of Article 20.2 of the CRFAO (except, for some reason, Part 7), under condition that this action does not contain signs of a criminal offense. In such case a citizen faces an administrative fine ranging from 150,000 rubles to 300,000 rubles (about 6.309 EUR at the time of the adoption of the law and approximately 4.259 EUR at the moment), or mandatory work for up to 200 hours, or an administrative arrest (one of the forms of imprisonment practiced in Russia) for up to 30 days.

It is worth mentioning that in June, 2014 an administrative arrest (but for up to 15 days) as a form of penalty was both stated in Part 6.1 of the Article 20.2 of the CRFAO and provided for violation of the procedures of organizing and/or carrying out a public event without giving the appropriate notice, associated with the creation of interference in the operation of transportation or social infrastructure, communication facilities, pedestrian traffic and/or transport, citizens’ access to living quarters, exceeding the maximum occupancy limits of the place of assembly, as well as for violation of the procedure for the conduct of a public event by its participant that caused harm to human health or property with no signs of a criminal offense (as stated in Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Article 20.2 of the CRFAO). Thus, there was only one offense left in the article in question (i.e. violation of the procedure for the conduct of a public event by its participant) that did not implement imprisonment as a penalty alternative to an administrative fine ranging from 10,000 rubles to 20,000 rubles (about 420 EUR at the time of the adoption of this legislation in 2012 and approximately 283 EUR at the moment) or to mandatory work for up to 40 hours.

In February 2016, yet some more anti-democratic changes were introduced into the Federal Law on Assemblies at the initiative of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation. According to this new amendment, one-person action with the use of “prefabricated demountable structures” now requires a notification (and that means the formal approval) of the authorities at least three days in advance. The same law suggested considering group movement on any vehicle(s) as a public event.

Also, the Federal Law “On the Fundamentals of the Prevention of Offenses of Russia” was adopted in June 2016. This law introduced the concept of “antisocial behavior” to the legislation, defined as “actions of an individual that violate the generally accepted norms of behavior and morality, as well as the rights and legitimate interests of others, but do not entail administrative or criminal liability”. There are reasons to believe that on the basis of this law with its vague definitions the po-

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4 Prior to the adoption of these changes, it was possible (since 2004) to hold a one-person picket without giving notice of such a campaign to the related state authority.
lice can start to collect data on the participants of peaceful opposition gatherings (there is information that citizens who participated in public events in Moscow on March, 26th and June, 12th, 2017, were put on preventive record by the police using this law).

Finally, the amendment of the Federal Law on Assemblies that took place this year in May extended the requirements of this law to street meetings of deputies of all levels with their electors. Thus, now such meetings must be notified in advance (not earlier than 10 and no later than 5 days before the day of their holding) to the related authorities who in turn may not agree with the place and time of the event proposed by a deputy on the basis of various pretexts.

It is obvious that the described process of the degradation of Russian legislation, which in general finds support from the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, forms in the minds of the officials at all levels a distrust concerning the right to freedom of peaceful assembly when they want to use it to criticize state policy, to condemn certain anti-democratic tendencies in the public life of Russia or to draw attention to the needs of various kinds of minorities. In practice, this leads to many violations of most of the OSCE Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, a small number of which is presented below as the examples.

**Legitimacy:** Any restrictions should be based on the provisions of the law. The law itself must be specific enough to enable each person to determine whether his/her behavior is a violation of the law and what the most likely consequences of such violations might be.

The cases of restriction of freedom of peaceful assembly by Russian administrative and judicial bodies often do not have a proper basis in the legislation. The ban on carrying out any public event on Red Square in Moscow due to its proximity to Kremlin illustrates this problem.

On the one hand, Article 8 of the Federal Law on Assemblies (since its adoption in 2004) does indeed establish an absolute ban on holding any public events on the territories directly adjacent to the residences of the President of the Russian Federation, the main one being the Moscow Kremlin. On the other hand, Article 2 of the same law states that the boundaries of such territories can only be determined by decisions of regional or local authorities (any such decision, by virtue of the requirements of Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, can not be applied until it has been officially published for the general information).

Despite the fact that Moscow does not yet have a regional or local legal act that establishes the boundaries of the territory directly attached to the Kremlin, where public events are banned, the authorities often persecute participants in such
events on Red Square, referring exclusively to Article 8 of the Federal Law on Assemblies. An example of such practice can be the decision of the Tverskoi District Court of Moscow dated by October 19\textsuperscript{th}, 2016 which imposed an administrative fine of 10.000 rubles on a participant of a picket that took place on Red Square on August 25\textsuperscript{th}, 2016. The picket itself was meant to commemorate the demonstration of dissidents conducted in 1968 in the same place and on the same day in protest against the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia.

The application of Part 5 of Article 20.2 of the CRFAO in the same case also seems to contradict the principle of legitimacy. As it was mentioned above, The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (hereinafter – CC RF) in its decision of February 14\textsuperscript{th}, 2013, recognized the aforementioned norm of the CRFAO as not in conformity with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, to the extent that the minimum penalty was an administrative fine of 10.000 rubles. In this regard, the CC RF obliged the Russian parliament to make the necessary changes to the legal regulation of the minimum fines for administrative offenses provided for in Part 5 of Article 20.2 of the CRFAO.

The lawmakers are still ignoring this demand of the CC RF. However, even 3 years after the aforementioned court order was issued, Part 5 of Article 20.2 of CRFAO in its unconstitutional edition continued to be applied in many hundreds of cases of administrative offenses, which is unacceptable in a state governed by the rule of law.

**Non-discrimination:** Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. In regulating the freedom of assembly, the relevant authorities are obligated not to discriminate on any ground with respect to any individual or a group.

The Federal Law on Assemblies, since it was passed in 2004, establishes that one or more citizens of the Russian Federation as well as political parties, other public associations and religious associations, their regional offices and other structural units can be organizers of a public event with the minimal age of 18 for an individual organizing of demonstrations, processions and pickets, and 16 for an organizer of rallies and meetings. It follows from the literal content of this rule of law that foreigners and stateless persons can not be organizers of public events, even if they have a residence permit in Russia. In addition, minors aged 16 to 18 are not allowed to organize three out of five types of public events listed in the law, regardless of the number of potential participants in the proposed event, which is contrary to the principle of proportionality stated in Article 11 of the ECHR.

Besides, representatives of various minorities in the Russian Federation are regularly confronted with the impossibility to coordinate with the state authorities the holding of public events designed to draw attention to the values or problems of
these social groups. It seems that the members of LGBT community and also Protestant church members are the groups that suffer most in this aspect.

For instance, the victims of discrimination in both situations described were three organizers of Gay Pride which was planned to be held on March 31st, 2013 in the city of Syktyvkar (Komi Republic) to draw attention to the problem of spreading homophobia in Russian society. On March, 20th the city administration proposed to carry out this event which was planned as a cortege with up to 50 participants at one of the city’s parks. On the same day this proposal was accepted by the organizers of the Pride. However the news about the forthcoming Gay Pride raised the wave of public homophobic speeches by representatives of conservative social forces including the members of pro-government political party “United Russia” / “Yedinaya Rossiya” and the Russian Orthodox Church’s priests. As a result, the city administration has withdrawn its approval for the Gay Pride at the park without suggesting any alternative location for this event. In their decision the authorities referred to the discontent that the event planned caused among some of the city’s residents, as well as the circumstance that one of the organizers of the cortege was only 16 years old.

**Public places:** Meetings are the same legitimate use of public space as trade, traffic or pedestrians. This consideration must be taken into account when considering the need for any restrictions.

In Russia, it is almost impossible to obtain the consent of the authorized government body to conduct an opposition rally, demonstration or picketing in any crowded place, even if such measures are not formally prohibited there. At the same time, officials, as a rule, refer to the fact that the planned event will distract drivers of cars or interfere with the movement of pedestrians or the rest of children.

For example, in May 2017, the Perm City Administration did not agree to hold an anti-corruption demonstration with an estimated number of participants up to 150 on the sidewalk of one of the central streets of Perm on June 12, 2017 (on the national day “Day of Russia”). Officially, the administration referred to the following: “Holding an event... will not allow arranging the organized movement of the declared number of participants without creating difficulties for those citizens who are not involved in holding that public event. Also, unreasonable exits of pedestrians are possible both along the route of the demonstration and at intersections in violation of the Road Traffic Rules. ... Also, public measures with the use of visual agitation and paraphernalia surveyed by road users (drivers of vehicles), accompanied by sound reinforcement equipment, can become a factor of distracting drivers’ attention from the situation on the roadway and cause traffic accidents...”.

Russia: The State of Civil and Human Rights before the Presidential Elections
Visibility and audibility: Public meetings are held to bring ideas and messages to the attention of a particular person, group or organization. Therefore, it is necessary to facilitate the holding of meetings within the “visibility and audibility” of their target audience.

Article 8 of the Federal Law on Assemblies adopted in 2004 introduced an absolute ban on any public events in the territories directly adjacent to the penitentiary and judicial institutions, as well as to hazardous production and other facilities whose operation requires compliance with special safety regulations. At the same time, as already mentioned, Article 2 of the law authorizes regional or local authorities to determine the boundaries of such territories.

In itself, the above limitation of freedom of peaceful assembly, as formulated by the legislator, appears disproportionate, as, for example, picketing of industrial enterprises, prisons and courts are common practice in democratic countries. Also, there was at least one case known where the prohibition of public events at court buildings was a maliciously camouflaged ban of these activities at the buildings of other authorities.

In 2011, the administration of the city of Syktyvkar declared that central Stefanovskaya square is directly attached to the court building. The reason for this decision was several offices of the Constitutional Court of the Komi Republic on the eighth floor of the building of the regional Parliament in the same square. Although the amount of judicial work of this Court is tiny as in the entire year 2016 this court has issued only seven judicial acts and held only six court hearings in three cases; the city administration prohibited any public meetings in the Stefanovskaya square. Notwithstanding that there are also the buildings of the Parliament and the government of the Republic of Komi in that square, and since the 1960s the place itself is the only site in the city specially adapted for holding rallies and demonstrations with a large number of participants. As a result, only in 2017 three residents of Syktyvkar were subjected to significant administrative fines (10,000 rubles in two cases and half of this amount in yet another) for holding single pickets at Stefanovskaya Square, on weekends or holidays, when the Constitutional Court of the Komi Republic did not work at all.

Besides, it has already been mentioned above that, starting in 2012, Article 8 of the Federal Law on Assemblies authorizes the legislative bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation to independently determine the places in which meetings, rallies, marches and demonstrations are prohibited. In a significant number of Russian regions, the authorities used this rule of federal law to impose additional restrictions on the freedom of peaceful assembly, contrary to the principle of “visibility and audibility.”
In particular, since 2012 the Law of the Republic of Komi prohibits any public demonstrations within a radius of 50 meters from the entrances to the buildings occupied by public authorities of the Komi Republic, state bodies of the Komi Republic, self-government in the Komi Republic and public institutions of the Komi Republic. August 18, 2017, referring to this rule of law, the administration of the city of Syktyvkar banned holding a rally in front of the administration building with the number of participants up to 50 people to discuss the unsatisfactory work of the city public transport. It is worth noting that on June 12, 2017, on Syktyvkar city Day, the same site was used by the authorities to hold a concert with a larger number of participants.

Similar legislative restrictions apply in other regions. Thus, the legislation of the Republic of Bashkortostan prohibits the holding of public events in 50 meters from buildings occupied by state bodies and local self-government bodies, and the laws of the republic of Kalmykia prohibits such events 100 meters from buildings held by public authorities of the Republic of Kalmykia.

**Notifications:** *The process of submitting a notice of an assembly should not be burdensome or bureaucratic.*

Since 2006, the Federal Law on Assemblies gives parliaments of Russian regions the right to establish a procedure for notifying of public events. In many cases, regional authorities took advantage of this opportunity to complicate the proceedings as much as possible.

Thus, the Law of the Lipetsk Region, effective since 2006, states that if a citizen or several citizens of the Russian Federation act as the organizer of a public event, they have to file an application and the passport or the document replacing the passport of a citizen of the Russian Federation. May 18, 2015, referring to this rule of law, the Administration of the city of Lipetsk refused to agree on a picket to recall the numerous victims of the Stalin regime, at the Stalin monument, which was installed in the city two weeks before. The only reason for the decision of the authorities was that the organizers of this action, living 1,500 kilometers from Lipetsk (which roughly corresponds to the distance between Vienna and London), sent an application and copies of their passports by mail.

Hence, despite the enormous size of Russia, the regional laws in Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Karelia, the Chechen Republic, the Kaliningrad region, the Kirov region, Krasnoyarsk Territory and in some other areas exclude the possibility of notifying of public events by mail or email.

**Spontaneous meetings:** *If the law requires prior notification, its provisions should explicitly provide for the waiver of this requirement in cases where the submission of such notification is impossible from a practical point of view. The authorities should*
always ensure the protection of any spontaneous assembly and facilitate its conduct, provided that it remains peaceful.

On the night of February 27-28, 2015, in Moscow, near the Kremlin, a well-known opposition politician, former Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Boris Nemtsov, was shot dead. This crime shocked a significant part of Russian society and had a broad international resonance.

On Sunday, March 1, 2015, in one of the squares of the city of Murmansk there was a small action in the memory the killed politician. After the meeting, the most active participants were subjected to administrative fines of 20,000 rubles according to part 2 of Article 20.2 of the CRFAO, which establishes the responsibility for organizing a public event without submitting a notice to the competent authority by the established procedure. At the same time, the filing of such notification was impossible given the requirements of the Federal Law on Assemblies, as the event that had occurred two days before undoubtedly predisposed the immediate response of representatives of the disturbing part of society.

It should be noted that in Russia, the organizers and participants of peaceful assemblies are victims of violations not only of articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR but also of other rights guaranteed by it.

For example, problems remain in the sphere of a fair trial, enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR, when administrative organizers and participants of peaceful assemblies are brought to administrative responsibility for violations of the rules of participation in public events and their conduct.

As a rule, in such processes, there is no prosecution party, which, as established by ECHR5, is a violation of the right to an impartial court. This problem is structural since the involvement of the prosecution is not provided as mandatory in the CRFAO.

Also, in such processes, there is a violation of the adversarial principle. In such cases, there is usually no evidence of a committed administrative offence (for example, a testimony of independent witnesses, video materials), except for reports and explanations of police officers. However, usually courts reject applications for interrogation of police officers, although they are witnesses to the prosecution6. Even if the courts interrogate police officers, they do not verify the legitimacy of their actions, do not require them to justify the need for appropriate interference with the right to freedom of assembly7. Besides, courts often refuse

5 See ECHR decision on the case Karelin v. Russia, no. 926/08, §§ 38-84.
6 See ECHR decision on the case Frumkin v. Russia, no. 74568/12, § 165.
7 See ECHR decision on the case Kasparov and Others v. Russia (no. 2), no. 51988/07, § 49.
to include evidence provided by the defense party (for example, video and photo materials from the venue of a mass event) to the case files, and to interrogate defense witnesses\(^8\). On rare occasions, when witnesses of defense are heard by the court, their testimony is rejected as unreliable\(^9\), while the evidence of police officers enjoys absolute confidence in the courts\(^{10}\).

In addition, it is commonplace that court rulings on such cases are not publicly announced or published, which constitutes a violation of the right to public announcement of court rulings.

The case of one of the participants in a spontaneous anti-corruption march, held in Moscow on 26 March 2017, can be presented as an illustration of the aforementioned violations. By the decision of 22 May 2017, issued by the Tverskoy District Court of the city of Moscow, the participant was brought to administrative responsibility under Article 20.2, section 5 of the Code of Administrative Offenses and an administrative fine of 10,000 rubles was imposed on him. In the course of the consideration of the relevant case, all motions of the defence (to ensure participation of the prosecution in the trial, to interrogate police officers, to attach a video footage of the detention to the case file) were rejected. Despite this, by the decision of 16 August 2017, the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of the District Court. At the same time, to date, both judicial acts have not been announced publicly or published on the websites of the relevant courts.

Finally, during the dispersion of peaceful assemblies by the police, participants often become victims of arbitrary detentions or even battery, which violates Articles 5 and 3 of the ECHR, respectively.

The excessive use of force against participants in peaceful assemblies can be shown on the case of an elderly woman suffered a brain concussion on 6 May 2012, during the dispersal of the aforementioned rally on Bolotnaya Square (one of the police officers hit her on the head with a rubber truncheon). Despite the presence of numerous witnesses, the available video footage and medical documents confirming that the concussion was caused by serious injury, a criminal case was never initiated on this matter.

The problem of a lack of an effective investigation into the battery of participants in peaceful assemblies is also characteristic of situations when violent actions are committed against protesters defending liberal values, by activists of non-state pro-government organisations and movements such as the Cossacks, the SERB (South East Radical Block, or Russian Liberation Movement) and NLM (National Liberation Movement).

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8 See ECHR decision on the case Kasparov and Others v. Russia, no. 21613/07, § 66.
9 See ECHR decision on the case Annenkov and Others v. Russia, no. 31475/10, § 135.
10 See ECHR decision on the case Annenkov and Others v. Russia, no. 31475/10, § 135.
All this testifies to the fact that the Russian authorities wish to force into a corner, citizens who are capable and ready to exercise their right to freedom of assembly. In order to achieve this, the authorities have no other choice but to force them to cease the activities of fear to be detained or subjected to huge fines. The scrupulous, comprehensive and quite systematic administrative activity of the authorities on resolving the issue of the law on public events (bearing in mind that no attempts have been made to solve the issue before 2012) just cannot be explained in any other way. There are reasons to believe that the legal consequences of the adopted amendments and the scale of the subsequent actions, essentially oppressive in nature, taken by state bodies in order to develop the already approved norms restricting freedom of assembly, constituted the State’s response to citizens’ increased protest activity which was observed between 2011-2012, and were aimed at preventing citizens’ massive protest activity and its further development.

In a sense, since 2012, the government has been pursuing a policy aimed at creating obstacles to the enforcement of the right to freedom of assembly, perceiving it as a threat to public security and the rule of law. The policy has the following consequences:

- it makes the procedures for organising public events more complex;
- often, it does not provide adequate security for participants in public events;
- it creates conditions for citizens’ refusal to participate in public events as it increases punishment for violating the law on gatherings, rallies, demonstrations, marches and pickets (they can even face criminal responsibility; still, participants in public actions are often detained and brought to administrative responsibility sometimes even in the absence of any violations of public order by them);
- it does not stop the negative tendencies of the predominant use of forceful methods by representatives of the state bodies in stopping peaceful assemblies, not only those unsanctioned but sometimes even those sanctioned, indiscriminate approach to the use of force against citizens, excessive use of force and special means to alleged violators (disproportionate to the committed offense and applied in the absence of circumstances justifying the use of force);
- it does not use or it uses inefficiently the existing mechanisms to hold officials accountable in cases of undue restriction of citizens’ right to freedom of assembly (official data show that cases on similar administrative violations haven’t practically been initiated under Article 5.38 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation);
- it does not take sufficient measures to effectively investigate the use of violence and (or) abuse of authority by law enforcement officers in the event that a citizen reports the use of illegal measures by police officers during a public event.
Recommendations aimed at ensuring the enforcement of the right to freedom of assembly in the Russian Federation:

for the organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe:

☐ to recommend to the Russian Federation that it review its legislation, policies and practices in the field of enforcement and protection of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, and bring them in line with international human rights standards;

☐ to take measures aimed at ensuring prompt and effective response to gross and massive violations of the right to freedom of assembly in the Russian Federation.

for the Russian Federation:

☐ to bring the national legislation on public events in line with international standards regarding the enforcement of the right to freedom of assembly;

☐ to carry out the monitoring of the enforcement of the right to freedom of assembly in order to track down illegal actions of government officials before, during and after public meetings;

☐ to develop a comprehensive plan designed to bring about the fulfilment of international obligations, assumed by the Russian Federation in the field of ensuring freedom of assembly;

☐ to promptly and effectively analyse citizens’ reports of incidents of unlawful use of violence and special means; ensure effective supervision of the work of law enforcement agencies which verify the reports, in order to prevent procrastination or superficial and biased verifications of the incidents reported.
List of Individuals Recognized as Political Prisoners by the Memorial Human Rights Centre (with the Exception of Those Persecuted in connection with the Realization of their Right to Freedom of Religion) as of 10 September 2017

Asanov, Ali Akhmedovich, was born on 7 July 1982. A resident of the village of Urozhainoye in Crimea, he holds a higher education degree. He is married with four children. Prior to his arrest, Mr Asanov worked as a sales representative. He holds Russian and Ukrainian citizenships. Mr Asanov is charged under Part Two of Art. 212 (‘Participation in mass riots’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr Asanov was held in custody from 15 April 2015 to 6 April 2017 when he was placed under house arrest.

Bagavutdinova, Zarema Ziyavtudinovna, was born on 18 September 1968. A member of the Dagestani NGO ‘Pravozashchita’, she was sentenced to 5 years in a general-regime colony on a charge of committing a crime under Part One of Art. 205.1 (‘Incitement and other involvement of individuals in committing a crime envisaged under Art. 208 of the Russian Criminal Code’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Ms Bagavutdinova has been held in custody since 4 June 2013.

Balukh, Vladimir Grigoryevich, was born on 8 February 1971. A resident of the village of Serebryanka of the Razdolnoye district of Crimea, he is a farmer and a pro-Ukrainian activist who kept the Ukrainian nationality after 2014 and declined to accept the Russian passport. He was sentenced to 3 years and 7 months in a general-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 222 (‘Illega acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation, or bearing of firearms, its basic parts, ammunition, explosives, and explosive devices’). Mr. Balukh has been held in custody since 8 December 2016. On 29 August 2017, a new criminal case was opened.
against Vladimir Balukh for allegedly committing a crime envisaged under Part One of Art. 318 (‘Use of force against a representative of the authority’) of the Russian Criminal Code.

**Barabash, Kirill Vladimirovich,** was born on 21 January 1977. Mr Barabash is a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel. He was charged under Part One of Art. 282.2 (‘Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation’) of the Russian Criminal Code for having allegedly pursued the activities of the inter-regional public movement ‘Army of the People’s Will’, banned in Russia in 2010, through the Initiative Group for the Holding of a Referendum ‘For a responsible government’ ‘with the aim of carrying out extremist activities’. On 10 August 2017, he was sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony and stripped of his military rank. He has been held in custody since 17 December 2015.

**Barylyak, Ivan Mikhailovich,** was born on 19 February 1986. A resident of the city of Stavropol, Mr Baryilyak worked as a repair technician while studying law extramurally. He was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months in a strict-regime colony on a charge of crimes under Part Two of Art. 213 (‘Hooliganism’) of the Russian Criminal Code, point ‘a’ of Part Two, Art. 116, (‘Battery’), and point ‘a’ of Part Two, Art. 115 (‘Intentional Infliction of Light Injury’). Mr Barylyak was held in custody from 10 September 2014 to 24 December 2014; when he was placed under house arrest until 31 August 2015. He has been imprisoned after the pronouncement of the judgment on 31 August 2015.

**Bobyshev, Svyatoslav Vasilyevich,** was born on 9 August 1953. A professor at the Baltic State Technical University named after D. F. Ustinov (Voenmekh), he was charged with crimes under Art. 275 (‘High treason’) of the Russian Criminal Code for having allegedly transferred information on the Bulava missile to China. On 20 June 2012, he was sentenced by the St Petersburg City Court to 12 years in a strict-regime penal colony. He has been held in custody since 16 March 2010.

**Bogatov, Dmitry Olegovich,** was born on 29 January 1992. A resident of Moscow, he holds a higher education degree (the Moscow State University and the Moscow Pedagogic State University) and pursues a PhD. Prior to his arrest, he worked as a mathematics lecturer at the Moscow Finance and Law University, gave private mathematics lessons and worked as a programmer. He is married. He is charged with committing crimes under Part Two of Art. 205.2 (‘Public incitement of terrorist activities committed using the Internet’) and Part One of Art.30 in conjunction with Part One of Art. 212 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at organising mass riots’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He was in custody from 6 April to 24 July 2017 when he was placed under house arrest.
Borisov, Dmitri Valerievich, was born on 9 November 1985. A resident of the Krasnogorsk district of the Moscow region. In 2008, he graduated from the Financial Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation and was a businessman. He is single and has no children. He is charged under Part One of Art. 318 (‘Use of force against a representative of the authority’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He has been in custody since 8 June 2017.

Buchenkov, Dmitry Evgenevich, was born in 1978. Mr Buchenkov holds a PhD in Political Science. Prior to his arrest, he was employed as a deputy head of the department of History of Medicine and Social Sciences and Humanities at the Russian National Research Medical University named after N.I. Pirogov. He is an anarchist and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Moskovskaya Elektrichka. Mr Buchenkov is charged with crimes envisaged under Part Two of Art. 212 (‘Participation in mass riots’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 318 (‘Use of force against a representative of the authority’) in the Bolotnaya case. Mr Buchenkov was held in custody from 2 December 2015 to 3 March 2017, when he was placed under house arrest.

Chiygoz, Akhtem Zeytullaevich, was born on 14 December 1964. A resident of Bakhchysarai, Mr Chiygoz holds a higher education degree and is single. The closing indictment states that he holds two citizenships (Russian Federation and Ukraine). Mr Chiygoz was sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under under Part One of Art. 212 (‘Organization of mass riots’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He was taken into custody on 29 January 2015.

Degermendzhi, Mustafa Bekirovich, was born on 22 May 1989. He is a resident of the village of Grushevka in Sudak and is single. Prior to his arrest, he worked as a sales representative. Mr Degermendzhi holds two citizenships (Russian Federation and Ukraine). He was accused of crimes under Part Two of Art. 212 (‘Participation in mass riots’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He was held in custody from 7 May 2015 to 6 April 2017 when he was placed under house arrest.

Dilmukhametov, Airat Akhnafovich, was born on 21 June 1966. A resident of the city of Ufa in the Republic of Bashkortostan, he worked as a journalist. He was sentenced to 3 years in a strict-regime penal colony on charges under Part One of Art. 205.2 (‘Public appeals for terrorist activity’) of the Russian Criminal Code and banned from working as a journalist for 2 years after his release. Mr Dilmukhametov was under house arrest from 17 July 2013 to 16 January 2014. He has been held in custody since 12 March 2015.

Dmitriev, Yuri Alexeyevich, was born on 28 January 1956. A resident of the city of Pertozavodsk, he is a historian, researcher of the mass graves of victims of political repression, the head of the Karelia branch of the Memorial Society, a mem-
ber of the Commission for restoring the rights of rehabilitated victims of political repressions under the Government of the Republic of Karelia. He is charged under point ‘v’ of Part Two of Art. 242.2 (‘Use of a minor for the purposes of production of pornographic materials’), Part Three of Art. 135 (‘Perverted acts without the use of force against a minor’), and Part One of Art. 222 (‘Illegal storage of main components of firearms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He has been held in custody since 13 December 2016.

Geriyev, Zhelaudi Nasrudinovich, was born on 13 June 1993. A resident of the village of Mairtup of the Kurchaloi district of Chechnya, he is single. Mr Geriyev graduated from the Faculty of History of the Chechen State University and worked as a journalist at the Internet media ‘Kavkazsky Uzel’ (‘The Caucasus Knot’). He was sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part Two of Article 228 (‘Illegal storage and transportation of narcotic substances on a large scale without the purpose of selling’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He has been held in custody since 16 April 2016.

Karpyuk, Nikolai Andronovich, was born on 21 May 1964. He is a citizen of Ukraine. At the time of his arrest, he was one of the leaders of ‘Right Sector’, an organisation banned in Russia. Mr Karpyuk was accused of crimes under part One of Art. 209 (‘Creation of a stable armed group (gang) with the aim of assaulting individuals or organizations, and also operation of such a group (gang)’) of the Russian Criminal Code, points ‘v’, ‘z’ and ‘n’ of Art. 102 (‘Intentional murder of two or more people in connection with their professional duties, committed by a group of people by preliminary agreement’) of the Criminal Code of the Russian SFSR, and Part Two of Art. 15 in conjunction with points ‘v’, ‘z’ and ‘n’ of Art. 102 (‘Attempted premeditated murder of two or more people in connection with their professional duties, committed by a group of people by preliminary agreement’) and sentenced to 22 years and 6 months in prison. He has been in custody since 21 March 2014 although being deprived of freedom since 17 March 2014.

Kashapov, Rafis Rafailovich, was born on 2 July 1958. At the time of his arrest, he resided in the city of Naberezhnye Chelny and was the chair of the Naberezhnye Chelny branch of the Tatar Public Centre. He was charged with committing a crime under Part One of Art. 282 (‘Incitement of hatred, or abasement of human dignity’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part Two of Art. 280.1 (‘Public appeals for actions aimed a violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation committed using the Internet’). He has been in custody since 28 December 2014.

Klykh, Stanislav Romanovich, was born on 25 January 1974. He is a citizen of Ukraine, a lecturer at the Kiev Transportation and Economics College. Mr Klykh was charged with committing crimes under Part Two of Art. 209 (‘Participation in a stable armed group (gang) and in the assaults committed by it’) of the Rus-
sian Criminal Code, points ‘v’, ‘z’ and ‘n’ of Art. 102 (‘Intentional murder of two or
more people in connection with their professional duties, committed by a group
of people by preliminary agreement’) of the Criminal Code of the Russian SFSR,
and Part Two of Art. 15 in conjunction with points ‘v’, ‘z’ and ‘n’ of Art. 102 (‘At-
ttempted premeditated murder of two or more people in connection with their
professional duties, committed by a group of people by preliminary agreement’)
and sentenced to 20 years in prison. He was taken into custody by a court deci-
sion on 22 August 2014, being actually deprived of freedom since 8 August 2014.

Kolchenko, Alexander Aleksandrovich, was born on 26 November 1989. A res-
ident of Crimea, Mr Kolchenko is an anti-fascist who clashed with the far right. He
worked as a loader at the post office and a print shop, while studying geography
extramurally. Mr Kolchenko was sentenced to 10 years in a strict-regime penal
colony under Part Two of Art. 205.4 (‘A terrorist act committed by an organised
group’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He has been held in custody since 16 May
2014.

Kolomiyets, Andrei Vladimirovich, was born on 8 May 1993. While holding
a permanent registration in his native village of Viktorivka in the Kiev region
of Ukraine, he was also temporarily registered in the village of Yantarny of the
Kabardino-Balkar Republic of the Russian Federation where he resided with his
common-law wife Galina Gennadyevna Zelikhanova. He was sentenced to 10
years of imprisonment in a strict-regime colony on the charges of committing
crimes under Part Three of Article 30 in conjunction with points ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘e’, ‘l’ of
Part Two, Art. 105 (‘Attempted murder of two individuals in connection with
their professional duties committed by generally dangerous means for reasons
of political or ideological hatred’) of the Russian Criminal Code and under Part
two of Art. 228 (‘Illegal acquisition, storage and transportation of plants contain-
ing narcotic or psychotropic substances on a large scale without the purpose of
selling’). He has been held in custody since 15 May 2015.

Kostenko, Alexander Fedorovich, was born on 10 March 1986. A resident of
Crimea, he is a former employee of the Kiev district branch of the Ukrainian Main
Department of Internal Affairs in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the city of
Simferopol. Mr Kostenko was sentenced to 3 years and 11 months of imprisonment
in a general-regime penal colony on the charge of crimes under point ‘b’ of Part Two,
Art. 115 (‘Intentional infliction of light injury which has caused temporary damage
of health, committed for reasons of ideological hatred or enmity’) of the Russian
Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 222 (‘Illegal storage and bearing of firearms and
ammunition’). He has been held in custody since 6 February 2015.

Kravtsov, Gennady Nikolaevich, was born on 30 October 1968. A resident of
the city of Moscow, he worked as a chief design engineer at an IT company. He
was sentenced to 14 years in prison in a strict-regime penal colony on a charge of committing a crime under Art. 275 (‘High treason’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He has been held in custody since 27 May 2014.

**Krepkin, Dmitri Mikhailovich,** was born in 26 October 1984. A resident of Moscow, he worked as a repair technician. He is single. He is charged with committing a crime under Part One of Art. 318 (‘Use of force against a representative of the authority’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He has been held in custody since 16 May 2017.

**Kudayev, Rasul Vladimirovich,** was born on 23 January 1978. He resided in the village of Khasanya near the city of Nalchik at the time of his arrest. He was charged with crimes under points ‘a’, ‘e’, ‘zh’ and ‘z’ of Art. 105 (‘Murder of two or more individuals by generally dangerous means by an organized group, out of mercenary interest related to banditry’) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Part Four of Art. 166 (‘Unlawful occupancy of transport vehicles without the intention to commit theft committed by an organized group with the use of force dangerous to life and health, and also with the threat of using such force’), Part Three of Art. 205 (‘Terrorist act using firearms committed by an organized group resulting in dangerous consequences’), Part Two of Art. 209 (Participation in a stable armed group (band) with the aim of assaulting individuals or organizations, and in the assaults committed by it’), Part Two of Art. 210 (‘Participation in a criminal group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation, or bearing of firearms, its basic parts, ammunition, explosives, and explosive devices committed by an organized group’), Part Two of Art. 30 and points ‘a’ and ‘b’ of Part Four, Art. 226 (‘Attempt to steal firearms and ammunition committed by an organized group with the use of force dangerous to life and health, and also with the threat of using such force’), points ‘a’ and ‘b’ of Part Four, Art. 226 (‘Theft of firearms and ammunition committed by an organized group with the use of force dangerous to life and health, and also with the threat of using such force’), Art. 279 (‘Active participation in an armed mutiny aimed at a forcible change of the constitutional order or a violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation’), and Art. 317 (‘Attempt on the life of law enforcement officers or military service personnel’). Mr Kudayev was sentenced on 21 December 2014 to life imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony. He had been held in custody since 23 October 2005 in connection with his alleged participation in the Nalchik attack on 13 October 2005.

**Kuly, Yuri Yevgenyevich,** was born on 29 November 1989. A resident of the village of Karavayevo ozero of the Domodedovo city district of the Moscow region, he pursued a PhD in sociology and worked as a head of the redevelopment office
and as a theatre and cinema actor. He was charged with crimes under Part One of Art. 318 (‘Use of force against a representative of the authority’) of the Russian Criminal Code and sentenced to 8 months of imprisonment in a low-security penal colony. He has been held in custody since 4 April 2017.

Kungurov, Alexei Anatolyevich, was born on 6 March 1977. A resident of the city of Tyumen, he is an opposition blogger and journalist of left nationalist persuasion. Mr Kungurov is charged with Part One of Art. 205.2 (‘Public justification of terrorism’) of the Russian Criminal Code for having published a post in his blog, critical of the Russian military operation in Syria. Since 15 June 2016, he has been held in custody while awaiting trial.

Kutayev, Ruslan Makhamdiyevich, was born on 20 September 1957. A Chechen civil society activist, he has a PhD in philosophy. Mr Kutayev was sentenced to 3 years and 10 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony on a charge of committing a crime under Part Two of Art. 228 (‘Illegal storage and transportation of narcotic substances on a large scale without the purpose of selling’) of the Russian Criminal Code in a fabricated case after holding a conference, entitled ‘The deportation of the Chechen people: What was it and can it be forgotten?’ organised without a formal permission from the authorities of the Chechen Republic. He has been in custody since 20 February 2014.

Lapygin, Vladimir Ivanovich, was born on 27 August 1940. A resident of Moscow, he holds a PhD in technical sciences and is an associate professor. He is married. Prior to his arrest, he worked as a deputy chief of the Centre for heat exchange and aerogasdynamics of the Central Scientific Research Institute for Machine Building Technology (TsNIIMash, the main centre of Roscosmos) and lectured at the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. He was charged under Art. 275 (‘High treason’) and sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony. He was placed under house arrest on 13 May 2015. Mr Lapygin has been held in custody since 6 September 2016.

Litvinov, Sergei Nikolaevich, was born on 9 March 1983. He lived in the village of Kamyshnoe in the same district. A citizen of Ukraine, he has an incomplete secondary education, and, according to his wife, is almost illiterate. Mr Litvinov was not conscripted into the army on grounds of ill health. According to the charges laid against him, he was not officially employed, and is single with no children. However, according to media reports, he is married with a 14-year-old daughter. He was sentenced to 8 years and 6 months in a strict-regime penal colony under Part Three of Art. 162 (‘Robbery, involving illegal entry to a residence, premises or other storehouse or on a large scale’) of the Russian Criminal Code.

Navalny, Oleg Anatolyevich, was born in 1983. He is the brother of Alexei Na-
valny, and a former employee of the Federal Russian Post Office. Mr Navalny was convicted on 30 December 2014 in the Yves Rocher case under Part Three of Art. 159 (‘Swindling on a large scale’) of the Russian Criminal Code, Part Three of Art. 159.4 (‘Swindling on a particularly large scale in the entrepreneurial sphere’), and point ‘a’ of Part Two, Art. 174.1 (‘Laundering of funds on a large scale acquired by a person through a crime committed by him’). He was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony and a fine of 500,000 roubles. He has been in custody since 30 December 2014.

Nikiforov, Sergei Savelevich, was born on 31 October 1968. A resident of the village of Ivanovskoye in the Amur Region, he is married with five foster children. Mr Nikiforov had been the head of the Ivanovsky rural council (an elected office, second term); he was temporarily suspended from the office. He is the leader of the local Evenk community. Mr Nikiforov was found guilty of crimes under point ‘v’ of Part Five, Art. 290 (‘Bribe-taking by a functionary on a large scale’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part Two of Art. 285 (‘Use by the head of a local self-government of official powers, contrary to the interests of the service, out of mercenary or other personal interest’). The court of first instance sentenced him to 5 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony, a fine of 16 million roubles and a further prohibition on holding official positions in local self-government bodies for 2 years and 6 months. The appeals court reduced the sentence to 4 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony, a fine of 3 million roubles and a prohibition on holding official positions in local self-government bodies for 2 years.

Nikonov, Alexei Vyacheslavovich, was born on 8 August 1982. At the time of his arrest, he served as a field operations police officer at the rank of captain at the Criminal Investigations Department of the Kostroma district branch of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. He was sentenced to 3 years and 7 seven months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony and a fine of 150 thousand roubles under Part Three of Article 272 (‘Illegal access to a protected computer information followed by its modification or copying, committed by a group of people by preliminary agreement’) of the Russian Criminal Code, Part One of Article 286 (‘Exceeding official powers’), Part Three of Article 290 (‘Bribe-taking by a functionary for the commission of knowingly illegal actions’). He has been deprived of freedom since 28 July 2015.

Panfilov, Maksim Alekseevich, was born in 1985. He is a resident of Astrakhan and suffers from a neurological health condition. At the time of his arrest, he was not officially employed. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 212 (‘Participation in mass riots’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 318 (‘Use of force against a representative of the authority’) in the Bolotnaya case. He has been held in custody since 7 April 2016.
Parfyonov, Valery Nikolaevich, was born on 3 August 1974. A resident of the city of Moscow, he worked as a systems administrator at the Moscow Unified Energy Company. Mr Parfyonov was charged with committing a crime under Part One of Art. 282.2 (‘Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation’) of the Russian Criminal Code, for having allegedly pursued the activities of the inter-regional public movement ‘Army of the People’s Will’, banned in Russia in 2010, through the Initiative Group for the Holding of a Referendum ‘For a responsible government’ ‘with the aim of carrying out extremist activities’. On 10 August 2017, he was sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony. Mr Parfyonov has been in custody since 28 July 2015.

Parpulov, Petr Ivanovich, was born in 1955. From the 1980s to his detention in 2014, he worked as an air traffic control officer at the civilian airport in Sochi although he had already reached pensionable age. Mr Parpulov was found guilty under Art. 275 (‘High treason’) of the Russian Criminal Code and sentenced to 12 years in a strict-regime penal colony. He has been in custody since 4 March 2014.

Pichugin, Alexei Vladimirovich, was born on 25 July 1962. He is a former head of the department for internal economic security for the Yukos oil company. Two guilty verdicts were delivered against him, in 2005 and 2007, under Art. 162 (‘Robbery’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Art. 105 (‘Murder’). He was sentenced to life imprisonment in a special-regime penal colony. Mr Pichugin has been in custody since 19 June 2003.

Politikov, Alexei Vladimirovich, was born on 10 November 1972. A resident of Ussuriysk in the Primorsky Krai, he worked as a shipping agent and was an activist of the Artpodgotovka movement. He is charged with committing a crime under Part One of Art. 318 (‘Use of force against a representative of the authority’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr Politikov has been held in custody since 10 June 2017.

Polyudova, Darya Vladimirovna, was born on 4 February 1989. At the time of her arrest, she was a resident of the city of Krasnodar. She is a Left Front activist. On 21 December 2015, she was sentenced to 2 years in a low security penal colony under Part One of Art. 280 (‘Public appeals for an extremist activity’) of the Russian Criminal Code, Part Two of Art. 280 (‘Public appeals for an extremist activity committed using the Internet’), Part Two of Art. 280.1 (‘Public appeals for actions aimed at a violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation’) in connection with her participation in the preparation of a ‘March for the Federalization of the Kuban’ that did not take place. The sentence entered into force on 30 March 2016. On 20 April 2016, Ms Polyudova independently arrived at her place of detention.
Reznikov, Sergey Petrovich, was born on 25 January 1961. A resident of Moscow, he is the general director of the ‘Demetra-2000 M’ limited liability company. Since 2003, he had been a member of the territorial electoral commission of the district of Prospect Vernadskogo representing the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. On 6 April 2017, he was sentenced to 3 years of general-regime penal colony on charges under Part Two of Art. 228 (‘Illegal storage of narcotic substances on a large scale’) of the Russian Criminal Code. On the same day, he was taken into custody.

Safargali, Danis Vildanovich, was born on 5 May 1976. A resident of the town of Arsk in the Republic of Tatarstan, he worked as a captain and a chief engineer of a vessel. He is the leader of the Tatar patriotic front of Altyn Urda. Mr Safargali was sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part Two of Art. 115 (‘Intentional infliction of light injury, motivated by hooliganism’) Part Two of Art. 116 (‘Battery, motivated by hooliganism’), Part Two of Art. 213 (‘Hooliganism committed by a group of people by preliminary agreement’), Part One of Art. 282 (‘Incitement of hatred, or abasement of human dignity committed using the Internet’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He has been held in custody since 21 October 2016.

Sentsov, Oleg Gennadyevich, was born on 13 July 1976. A resident of the city of Simferopol, Mr Sentsov is a film director and producer. He was an Automaidan activist and supported the movement for a united Ukraine in Crimea in February-March 2014. Mr Sentsov was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony on the charges of crimes envisaged under Part One of Art. 205.4 (‘Organisation of a terrorist group’) of the Russian Criminal Code, two episodes under point ‘a’ of Part Two, Art. 205 (‘Terrorist act committed by an organised group’), Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two, Art. 205, (‘Preparation of a terrorist act’), Part Three of Art. 30 in conjunction with Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Attempted illegal acquisition of firearms and explosive devices’), and Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Illegal acquisition and storage of firearms and explosive devices’). Mr Sentsov has been in custody since 11 May 2014.

Shishkin, Vitaly Viktorovich, was born on 6 August 1972. He is a Russian citizen and an opposition activist of Russian nationalist persuasion. Mr Shishkin was sentenced to 3 years and 11 months in a general-regime penal colony on charges of committing crimes under Part Three of Art. 212 (‘Appeals for mass riots’) and Part One of Art. 282 (‘Incitement of hatred or enmity’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr Shishkin has been in custody since 13 February 2015.

Shpakov, Alexander Yuryevich, was born on 5 July 1977. A resident of the city of Lyubertsy of the Moscow region, he worked as a carpenter. He took part in an anti-corruption rally in the city centre of Moscow on 26 March 2017. On 24 May
2017 he was sentenced to 1 year and 6 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 318 (‘Use of force against a representative of the authority’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr Shpakov has been held in custody since 28 March 2017.

**Smyslyayev, Maxim Nikolayevich,** was born on 22 December 1982. He is a resident of the city of Rostov-on-Don of left persuasions. At the time of his arrest, he worked at a McDonald’s outlet and studied extramurally at the Institute of History and International Relations of the Southern Federal University. He was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part Three of Art. 205.1 (‘Complicity in the preparation of a terrorist act’) of the Russian Criminal Code for having allegedly aided a minor holding the citizenship of Ukraine in the preparation of a terrorist act that did not take place. He has been held in custody since 22 April 2016.

**Sokolov, Alexander Aleksandrovich,** was born on 17 November 1987. A resident of the city of Moscow, he holds a PhD in economics. He worked as a journalist at the RBC news agency. Mr Sokolov was charged with committing a crime under Part Art. 282.2 (‘Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation’) of the Russian Criminal Code for having allegedly pursued the activities of the inter-regional public movement ‘Army of the People’s Will’, banned in Russia in 2010, through the Initiative Group for the Holding of a Referendum ‘For a responsible government’ ‘with the aim of carrying out extremist activities’. On 10 August 2017, he was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months of imprisonment in a general regime penal colony. Mr Sokolov has been in custody since 28 July 2015.

**Staroverov, Yury Viktorovich,** was born on 14 November 1982. He is an activist of the party ‘The Other Russia’ and a member of the civil movement of Nizhny Novgorod. Mr Staroverov was charged under Part One of Art. 318 (‘Use of force against a representative of the authority’) of the Russian Criminal Code and given a 3-year suspended term with a period of 3 years of probation for having allegedly hit a riot police officer during the dispersal of a civil march on 15 September 2012. On 10 February 2016, the Ostankinsky district court of the city of Moscow replaced the verdict with 3 years of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony. Mr Staroverov was taken into custody on the same day.

**Tutisani, Inga Zhorayevna,** was born on 18 February 1970. A resident of Sochi, she is unemployed. She was sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment in a general regime penal colony under Art. 275 (‘High treason’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Ms Tutisani has been held in custody since 25 October 2013.
Tyumentsev, Vadim Viktorovich, was born on 3 December 1980. A resident of the city of Tomsk, he is a video blogger and a civil society activist. Mr Tyumentsev is charged with committing crimes under Part Two of Art. 280 (‘Public appeals for an extremist activity committed using the Internet’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 282 (‘Actions aimed at the incitement of enmity, or abasement of human dignity on the basis of their sex, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion and also their affiliation with a social group.’). Mr Tyumentsev has been in custody since 28 April 2015.

Zagreev, Robert Raufanovich, was born on 3 July 1964. A resident of the city of Ufa in the Republic of Bashkortostan, he is a journalist and an opposition politician. He was sentenced to 3 years in prison in a strict-regime penal colony on charges of crimes under Part One of Art. 205.2 (‘Public appeals for terrorist activity’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr Zagreev was under house arrest from 27 April to 22 May 2015, and has been in custody since 29 October 2015.

Zimovets, Stanislav Sergeyevich, was born in 14 April 1985. A resident of the town of Volzhsky of the Volgograd region, he holds an incomplete higher education degree. He served as a combat engineer in Chechnya and he was not officially employed. Mr Zimovets was sentenced to 2 years and 6 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 318 (‘Use of force against a representative of the authority’). He has been held in custody since 1 April 2017.
List of Individuals Recognized as Political Prisoners by the Human Rights Centre Memorial and Persecuted in connection with the Realization of their Right to Freedom of Religion as of 10 September 2017

Akhmetov, Radik Mudarisovich, was born on 18 September 1997. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, at the time of his arrest, he was temporarily unemployed. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’) as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in any violent actions. Mr Akhmetov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Akhmetshin, Fanis Faritovich, was born on 2 February 1963. A construction foreman, he is a resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part Two of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’) as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in any violent actions. Mr Akhmetshin has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Akhtakhanov, Tagir Tapayevich, was born on 1 March 1980. A resident of the village of Achkhoi-Martan of the Achkhoi-Martan district of Chechnya, he is single and completed secondary education. He was sentenced to 11 years of impris-
Asylov, Ruslan Denisovich, was born on 6 June 1986. A resident of the town of Dyurtyuli of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he completed secondary education and is married with a child. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in any violent actions, he was sentenced to 6 years and 4 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part Two of Art. 282.2 (‘Participation in the activities of an extremist organization’) and Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Asylov has been held in custody since 25 February 2015.

Balakadashev, Inyal Ibragimovich, was born on 12 August 1987. Legally a resident of the village of Kaladzhukh of the Dokuzpar district of the Republic of Dagestan, actually he lived in the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. He is married and completed secondary education. Prior to his arrest, he worked as a sailor. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Article 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two of Article 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Article 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Article 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Balakadashev has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

Balakadashev, Nurmagomed Ibragimovich, was born on 8 July 1983. Legally, a resident of the village of Kaladzhukh of the Dokuzpar district of the Republic of Dagestan, actually he lived in the city of Moscow. He is married with a child and completed secondary education. Prior to his arrest, he worked as a shipping agent. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Article 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two of Article 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Article 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Article 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Balakadashev has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

Cheprasov, Sergei Sergeyevich, was born on 10 June 1990. Legally, a resident of the village of Sukhaya Olshanka of the Chernyanka district of the Belgorod
region. He is single and completed professionalized secondary education. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Article 30 in conjunction with point 'a' of Part Two of Article 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Article 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Article 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Cheprasov has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

**Christensen, Dennis Ole**, was born on 18 December 1972. A subject of the Kingdom of Denmark, at the time of his arrest he held a Russian residence permit and lived in the city of Oryol in Russia. He is charged with committing a crime under Part One of Art. 282 (‘Organization of the activities of an extremist organization’) of the Russian Criminal Code for his membership in a community of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Mr Christensen has been held in custody since 25 May 2017.

**Esmurzayev, Khoso Gashimovich**, was born on 27 August 1976. A resident of the village of Zyazikov-Yurt of the Maglobek district of Ingushetia, he completed secondary education and is single. Prior to his arrest, he worked as a taxi driver. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Article 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two of Article 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Article 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Article 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Esmurzayev has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

**Faizrakhmanov, Danis Mirratovich**, was born on 4 September 1988. A construction worker, he is a resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of activities aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’) as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organisation banned in Russia. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has never been involved in any violent actions, Mr Faizrakhmanov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

**Faizullin, Aidar Rifovich**, was born on 24 November 1985. A resident of the town of Dyurtyuli in the Republic of Bashkortostan, Mr Faizullin holds a higher education degree. He is single. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organization banned in Russia, he was sentenced to 5 years and 2 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part Two of Art. 282.2 (‘Participation in the activities of an extremist organization) and Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian
Fattakhov, Rafael Raulevich, was born on 25 May 1980. A construction finishing worker, he was a resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 of the Russian Criminal Code ('Participation in the activities of an organisation designated as terrorist under Russian law') and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 ('Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order') as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organisation banned in Russia. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has never been involved in any violent actions, Mr. Fattakhov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Fattakhov, Ruslan Vakilevich, was born on 14 November 1980. A private entrepreneur engaged in commerce, he is resident in the Republic of Bashkortostan. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 ('Participation in the activities of an organization designated under Russian law as terrorist') of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 ('Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order') as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organisation banned in Russia. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has never been involved in any violent actions, Mr. Fattakhov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Fazylov, Aramis Fanisovich, was born on 21 July 1991. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he was employed in multi-level marketing. He was charged under part Two of Art. 205.5 ('Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law') of the Russian Criminal Code as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia and sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has never been involved in any violent actions, Mr Fazylov has been placed under house arrest and has been deprived of liberty since 4 February 2015.

Gabdullin, Rustam Alfridovich, was born on 19 April 1992. A resident of the town of Dyurtyuli, Mr Gabdullin holds a diploma of completed secondary education. He is married with a child. In 2011, he was charged under Part One of Art. 282.2 ('Organisation of the activities of an extremist organization') of the Russian Criminal Code and was given a 1-year suspended sentence with a period of 2 years of probaton (the punishment was consequently reduced to a ten-month suspended sentence). As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an or-
ganization banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Gabdullin was sentenced to 5 years and 2 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part Two of Art. 282.2 (‘Participation in the activities of an extremist organization’) and Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’). With the two verdicts combined, the sentence amounts to 5 years and 6 months in prison. Mr Gabdullin has been held in custody since 25 February 2014.

Galimkhanov, Rustam Rafitovich, was born 30 September 1991. A resident of the town of Dyurtyuli, he holds a higher education degree. He is married. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organization banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Galimkhanov was sentenced to 5 years and 2 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part Two of Art. 282 of the Russian Criminal Code (‘Participation in the activities of an extremist organisation’) and Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’). Mr Galimkhanov has been held in custody since 25 February 2014.

Galiullin, Rinat Faizullovich, was born on 25 June 1978. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organization banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Galiullin was charged under Part One of Art. 205.1 (‘Incitement and other involvement of individuals in committing a crime envisaged under Art. 278’), Part One of Art.30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’), Part One of Art. 282.2 (‘Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation’) of the Russian Criminal Code and was sentenced to 6 years and 6 months of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony followed by 1 year of ‘restricted freedom’ and a fine of 150,000 roubles. Mr Galiullin has been held in custody since 31 July 2012.

Gallyamov, Rustem Ravilevich, was born on 10 August 1981. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he was a director of the Eko-Svetstroi company. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist by Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’) as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organisation banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in violent action. Mr Gallyamov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Garifyanov, Aidar Rafilovich, was born in 1976. He is a resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization
banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in violent actions, Mr Garifyanov was charged under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’) of the Russian Criminal Code, and Part 1 of Art. 282.2 (‘Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation’) and sentenced to 6 years in a strict-regime penal colony. Mr Garifyanov has been held in custody since 26 August 2013.

Gataullin, Rishat Razitovich, was born on 14 April 1972. He is a resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist by Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organisation banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in violent action. Mr Gataullin has been placed under house arrest since 4 February 2015.

Gimaletdinov, Ilgiz Failovich, was born on 18 November 1988. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he worked as a manager at the SrubMontazh company. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’) as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organisation banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in violent action. Mr Gimaletdinov has been in custody since 4 February 2015.

Ibatullin, Rainur Anisovich, was born on 23 February 1989. A resident of the city of Almetievsk, he holds a degree of electric power station engineer from the Kazan Energy University. He is officially unmarried and has a child born in 2013. He was not officially employed. Mr Ibatullin was sentenced by the Privolzhsky district military court to 17 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 205.5 (‘Organisation of the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) and Part One of Art. 205.1 (‘Financing of terrorist activities’) in connection with his participating in the organisation of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, and collecting member subscriptions (₽200 – 1000 a month) from the organization membership. He has been held in custody since 19 May 2015.

Inamov, Azizbek Khalikovich, was born on 9 April 1977. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in violent action, he was charged under Part One of Art. 282.2 (‘Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation’) of the Russian Criminal Code, Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with
Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’), Part One of Art. 205.1 (‘Incitement of other involvement of individuals in committing a crime envisaged under Art. 278 of the Russian Criminal Code’) and sentenced to 11 years in a strict-regime penal colony and a fine of 200,000 roubles. Mr Inamov has been held in custody since 7 November 2012.

Ismailov, Shamil Magomedrasulovich, was born on 20 October. A resident of Makhachkala, he worked as an urologist. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in violent action, he was charged under Part One of Art. 282.2 (‘Organization of the activities of an extremist organization’) of the Russian Criminal Code, Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’) and sentenced to 8 years in a strict-regime penal colony followed by 2-year period of ‘restricted freedom’, and a fine of 100,000 roubles. Mr Ismailov has been held in custody since 13 June 2013.

Kayumov, Azamat Rinatovich, was born on 30 September 1982. A resident in the Republic of Bashkortostan, he worked as a washing machine repair technician. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in violent action, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Mr Kayumov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Kazikhanov, Bagir Kurbanovich, was born on 9 September 1983. A resident of the city of Ulyanovsk, at the time of his arrest, he was officially unemployed but worked at a vegetable depot in Ulyanovsk. Mr Kazikhanov was charged under Part One of Art. 282.2 (‘Organisation of the activities of a banned religious organisation’) of the Russian Criminal Code for creating a cell of ‘Nurdjular’, a religious society based on the works of the Turkish theologian Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, which are banned in Russia, and sentenced to 3 years and 6 months in a general-regime penal colony. From 10 April to 24 October 2014, Mr Kazikhanov was held in a pre-trial detention centre; afterwards he was placed under house arrest until 25 February 2015. He has been held in custody ever since.

Khamadeyev, Alexei Alfritovich, was born in 1982. He is a resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was charged under Part One Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible
change of the constitutional order’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 282.2 (‘Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation’) and sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony. Even though according the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has never been involved in violent actions, Mr Khamadeyev has been in custody since 26 August 2013.

Khamzin, Rustem Valeryevich, was born on 6 April 1972. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he was a businessman. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Even though according the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has never been involved in violent actions, Mr Khamzin has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Khasanov, Azat Damirovich, was born on 20 December 1977. A resident of Kazan, he has incomplete secondary education. He is married with three underage children. At the time of his arrest, he was not officially employed. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was sentenced to 6 years and 6 months of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 282.2 (‘Organization of the activities of an extremist organization’) and point ‘v’ of Part Two of Art.282 (‘Incitement of hatred committed by an organized group’). Mr Shaikhutdinov has been in custody since 10 October 2013.

Khusniyarov, Shamil Faritovich, was born on 28 September 1979. A resident of the town of Dyurtyuli in the Republic of Bashkortostan, he holds a higher education degree. He is married with two children. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organization banned in Russia, Mr Khusniyarov was sentenced to 6 years and 4 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part Two of Art. 282 (‘Participation in the activities of an extremist organisation’) and Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’). Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Khusniyarov has been held in custody since 25 February 2015.

Kim, Yevgeny Lvovich, was born on 5 October 1974. A resident of Blagoveshchensk, he completed specialised secondary education. He was not officially employed. He was sentenced to 3 years and 9 months of imprisonment in a general regime penal colony followed by a 1-year period of ‘restricted freedom’ under Part One of Art. 282 (‘Incitement of hatred, or denigration of human dignity’) and Part One of Art. 282.2 (‘Organisation of the activities of an extremist organization’) for creating a cell of ‘Nurdjular’, a religious society based on the works of
the Turkish theologian Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, which are banned in Russia. Mr Kim has been held in custody since 27 December 2015.

Kornev, Alexander Valeryevich, was born on 22 September 1987. He is a staff member at the Institute for the Development of Education of the Republic of Bashkortostan. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 ('Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law') of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 ('Preparation of activities aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order'). Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Kornev has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Kulagin, Yevgeny Viktorovich, was born in 1981. He is a resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, Mr Kulagin was charged under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 ('Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order') of the Russian Criminal Code, and Part 1 of Art. 282.2 ('Organization of the activities of an extremist organisation') and sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Kulagin has been held in custody since 26 August 2013.

Kurbanov, Saipula Djabrailovich, was born on 9 April 1980. A resident of the city of Makhachkala, he worked as the general director of a dental clinic, EstDental. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was charged under Part One of Art. 282.2 ('Organization of the activities of an extremist organisation') of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 ('Preparation of a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order') and sentenced to 8 years in a strict-regime penal colony followed by 2 years of ‘restricted freedom’ and a fine of 150,000 rubles. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Kurbanov has been held in custody since 7 November 2012.

Kutluyarov, Gazim Gafarovich, was born on 1 August 1959. A resident of the town of Dyurtyuli in the Republic of Bashkortostan, he holds a higher education degree. He is single. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organization banned in Russia, Mr Kutluyarov was sentenced to 6 months in prison under Part Two of Art. 282 of the Russian Criminal Code ('Participation in the activities of an extremist organisation') and to 6 years in prison under Part Two of Art. 205.5 ('Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law'). Taking into account these crimes, a decision to sentence him to 6 years and 4 months of imprisonment in
a general-regime penal colony was delivered. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Kutluyarov has been held in custody since 25 February 2014.

**Latypov, Rustem Maratovich**, was born on 17 February 1976. He is the head of the human rights organization, ‘Centre for the Study of the Muslims’ Problems’, and a member of the Public Oversight Commission of the Republic of Bashkortostan. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, Mr Latypov was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Latypov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

**Magomedov, Khiramagomed Gadzhievich**, was born on 31 January 1985 and lived in the city of Makhachkala. He holds an incomplete higher education degree in economics. He is one of the leaders of the NGO “Soyuz spravedlivykh” (‘The Union of the Just”). As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was found guilty of committing crimes under Part Two of Art. 282.2 (‘Participation in the activities of an extremist organisation’), Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’), Part One of Art. 205.1 (‘Incitement and other involvement of individuals in committing a crime envisaged under Art. 205, 206, 208, 211, 277, 278, 279 и 360 of the Russian Criminal Code’), Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power or forcible change of the constitutional order’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation, or bearing of firearms, its basic parts, ammunition, explosives, and explosive devices’) and sentenced to 9 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Magomedov has been held in custody since 25 February 2016.

**Magomedov, Magomednabi**, was born on 3 October 1972. At the time of his arrest, he resided in the village of Kirovaul of the Kizilyurt district of the Republic of Dagestan and was the imam of the mosque ‘Vostochnaya’ in the town of Khasavyurt. He is married with seven children. Mr Magomedov was charged under Part One of Art. 205.2 (‘Public appeals to engage in terrorist activities or public justification of terrorism’) and with Part One of Art. 282 (‘Incitement of hatred, or denigration of human dignity’) and sentenced to 4 years and 6 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony. He has been placed in custody on 8 April 2016.
Maksutov, Radmir Yusifovich, was born on 31 March 1984. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he worked as a domestic appliance repair technician. As a member of the banned organization Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Maksutov has been in custody since 4 February 2015.

Mamayev, Rinat Mazitovich, was born on 25 July 1971. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he works as a manager. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, a forbidden organization in Russia, he was found guilty of committing crimes under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Mamayev has been placed under house arrest and deprived of liberty since 4 February 2015.

Maslakov, Artur Konstantinovich, was born on 2 July 1983. A resident of Moscow, he is single and has an incomplete secondary education. Prior to his arrest, he was not officially employed. He was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point “a” of Part Two of Art. 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Maslakov has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

Makhmudov, Tazhib Taimirovich, was born on 4 May 1982. A resident of Moscow, he completed secondary education and is married with two children. Prior to his arrest, he worked as a driver. He was sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point “a” of Part Two of Art. 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Makhmudov has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

Mustafayev, Farid Ramazanovich, was born on 8 July 1987. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he worked in transportation business. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was
charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Mustafaev has been in custody since 4 February 2015.

**Mustafin, Khalil Fanavievich,** was born on 18 August 1984. A champion of the Republic of Bashkortostan and Russia and a world champion in martial arts, he worked as a domestic appliance repair technician. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Mustafin has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

**Nasimova, Matlyuba Islomovna,** was born on 30 July 1960. A resident of the city of Samarqand of the Republic of Uzbekistan and an Uzbek national, she holds an incomplete higher education degree from the Samarqand University. She is married with 8 children, two of them being underage. Since 2010, she has lived in Moscow, worked as a housemaid and sublet places in a flat that she rented. She was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two of Art. 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mrs. Nasimova has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

**Nurlygaynov, Rinat Ranifovich,** was born on 3 January 1991. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he is a student of the Russian Islamic University working as a refrigerator repair technician. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Nurlygaynov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.
Primov, Yury Vladimirovich, was born on 31 July 1976. At the time of his arrest, he resided in Sebastopol in Crimea. He holds a degree in drama and cinema acting of the Kiev Theatre Institute. At the time of his arrest, he was not officially employed and worked as a construction worker. He is divorced. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code for his alleged membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Primov has been placed in custody on 23 January 2015.

Ramazanov, Islam Magamedkerimovich, was born on 24 September. Legally a resident of the city of Derbent in Dagestan, he lived in Moscow. He completed secondary education and is single. Prior to his arrest, he worked as a driver. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two of Art. 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Ramazanov has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

Rakhmonkhodjayev, Zikrullokhon Faizullokhodjaevich, was born on 2 October 1975. A resident and citizen of Tajikistan. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organisation banned in Russia, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 282.2 (‘Participation in the activities of an extremist organization’) of the Russian Criminal Code, Part One of Art. 30, in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power or forcible change of the constitutional order’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation, or bearing of firearms, its basic parts, ammunition, explosives, and explosive devices’) and sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony and a fine of 50,000 roubles. Mr Rakhmonkhodjayev has been held in custody since 7 November 2012.

Saifullayev, Ferat Refatovich, was born on 21 July 1983. At the time of his arrest, he resided in the city of Sebastopol in Crimea. He holds a degree in management of the Simferopol branch of the Kiev University of Economics. He is married with two daughters and a son. At the time of his arrest, he was not officially employed. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 of the Russian Criminal Code (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) for his alleged membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Saifullayev has been held in custody since 2 April 2015.
Salakhov, Ilgiz Askhatovich, was born on 10 March 1975. A resident of the village of Ivanayevo of the Dyurtyuli district of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he holds a higher education degree. He is married with four children. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organization banned in Russia, Mr Salakhov was sentenced to 10 years and 6 months of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony followed by 1 year of ‘restricted freedom’ under Part One of Art. 282 of the Russian Criminal Code (‘Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation’) and Part One of Art. 205.5 (‘Organisation of the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’). Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Salakhov has been placed in custody on 25 February 2014.

Salimov, Artur Raulevich, was born on 5 September 1986. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he worked as an electrical technician. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Salimov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Salimov, Ilshat Maratovich, was born on 7 November 1987. A resident of the town of Dyurtyuli in the Republic of Bashkortostan, he holds a diploma of specialized secondary education. He is married with two children. In 2011, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 282.2 (‘Participation in the activities of an extremist organization’) of the Russian Criminal Code and was given a 1-year suspended sentence with a period of 1 year of probation. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, Mr Salimov was sentenced to 6 years and 4 months of imprisonment in a general-regime penal colony under Part Two of Art. 282.2 and Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’). With the two verdicts combined, the sentence amounts to 6 years and 6 months in prison. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Salimov has been held in custody since 25 February 2014.

Salimzyanov, Arslan Talgatovich, was born on 16 June 1986. A resident of Kazan, he hold a degree in industrial and civil construction from the Kazan State University of Architecture and Engineering. Mr Salimzyanov is married with two children. He is not officially employed. Mr Salimzyanov was sentenced by the Privolzhsky district military court to 16 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 205.5 (‘Organisation of the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) and Part One of Art.
Saraliyev, Ersmak Shagidovich, was born on 26 March 1959. Legally a resident of the urban community of Komsomolsky of the Chernozemelsky district of Kalmykia, he is single. He completed secondary education and was a businessman. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two of Art. 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Saraliyev has been held in custody since 8 December 2013.

Satayev, Rasim Radikovich, was born in 1988. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he was charged under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power or forcible change of the constitutional order’) of the Russian Criminal Code, and Part One of Art. 282.2 in conjunction with Art. 282.2 (‘Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation’) as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, and was sentenced to 6 years and 6 months in a strict-regime penal colony. Even though according to the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir has never been involved in any violent action, Mr Satayev has been held in custody since 26 August 2013.

Shakirov, Airat Ilgizarovich, was born on 26 July 1991. A resident of the town of Aznakayevo of the Republic of Tatarstan, he has completed secondary education. He is married with two children. Mr Shakirov was not officially employed. Mr Shakirov was sentenced by the Privolzhskiy district military court to 18 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 205.5 (‘Organisation of the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) and Part One of Art. 205.1 (‘Financing of terrorist activities’) in connection with his participating in the organisation of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia, and collecting member subscriptions (₽200 – 1000 a month) from the organization membership. He has been held in custody since 19 May 2015.

Shaikhutdinov, Ildar Khamitovich, was born on 6 November 1975. A resident of Kazan, he holds a higher education degree. He is married with two underage children. Prior to his arrest, Mr Shaikhutdinov worked as an assembly worker. He was sentenced to 5 years and 6 months of imprisonment in a general-regime
penal colony under Part Two of Art. 282.2 (‘Participation in the activities of an extremist organization’) and point ‘v’ of Part Two of Art.282 (‘Incitement of hatred committed by an organized group’). Mr Shaikhutdinov has been in custody since 10 October 2013.

**Sharipov, Shamil Khazhgalievich,** was born on 16 January 1977. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he worked as a washing machine repair technician. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Even though according the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has never been involved in violent actions, Mr Sharipov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

**Shavkhalov, Adam Akhmedovich,** was born on 3 April 1981. A resident of the village of Zyazikov-Yurt of the Maglobek district of Ingushetia, he completed secondary education and is single. At the time of his arrest, he was not officially employed. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two of Art. 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Shavkalov has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

**Suleimanov, Aslan Beslanovich,** was born on 11 June 1990. Legally a resident of the city of Grozny, he completed secondary education and is single. At the time of his arrest, he was not officially employed and worked part time at a market in Moscow. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two of Art. 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Suleimanov has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

**Tagirov, Irek Rishatovich,** was born on 5 April 1989. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he worked as a sales manager. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and part One of Art. 30
in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Even though according the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has never been involved in violent actions, Mr Tagirov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

**Tekilov, Anzor Mauletovich,** was born on 21 September 1988. Legally a resident of the city of Grozny, he completed secondary education and is single. At the time of his arrest, he was not officially employed. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two of Art. 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Tekilov has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

**Tekilov, Artur Mauletovich,** was born on 9 March 1990. Legally a resident of the city of Grozny, he completed secondary education and is single. At the time of his arrest, he was not officially employed. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point ‘a’ of Part Two of Art. 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Tekilov has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

**Tekilov, Imran Mauletovich,** was born on 10 November 1991. Legally a resident of the city of Grozny, he completed secondary education and is single. At the time of his arrest, he was not officially employed. He was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with point “a” of Part Two of Art. 205 (‘Preparation of a terrorist act to be committed by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms by an organized group’), Part Three of Art. 223 (‘Manufacturing of arms by an organized group’), Part One of Art. 222 (‘Storage of arms’) of the Russian Criminal Code. Mr. Tekilov has been held in custody since 27 November 2013.

**Vaitov, Rustem Mamutovich,** was born on 27 July 1986. At the time of his arrest, resided in the city of Sebastopol. He is married in religious, officially unregistered marriage with a daughter who was born after his arrest. He holds a degree in industrial and civil construction of the National Academy of Environmental and Resort Construction. At the time of his arrest, he was officially unemployed and worked as a construction worker. He was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code for his alleged membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an
organization banned in Russia that even according to the prosecution has never been involved in any violent action, and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment. Mr Vaitov has been held in custody since 23 January 2015.

Vakhitov, Linar Munirovich, was born on 25 April 1983. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he acted as the director of the ‘StroiAlyans’ company and the head of the human rights movement ‘For the Muslims’ Rights’. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia that even according to the prosecution has never been involved in violent actions, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Mr Vakhitov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Velitov, Makhmud Abdulkhakovich, was born on 7 September 1951. A resident of Moscow, he was the imam of the Yardam mosque. He holds a higher theological degree from the madrasa of Mir-Arab in Bukhara. Mr Velitov was sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment in a general regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 205.2 (‘Public appeals to engage in terrorist activities or public justification of terrorism’) of the Russian Criminal Code. He has been held in custody since 28 April 2017. From 11 July 2016 to 21 February 2017 he was placed under house arrest.

Yakupov, Ural Gaifullovich, was born on 24 May 1991. A resident of the Republic of Bashkortostan, he worked as a domestic appliance repair technician. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia, he was charged under Part Two of Art. 205.5 (‘Participation in the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’) of the Russian Criminal Code and Part One of Art. 30 in conjunction with Art. 278 (‘Preparation of actions aimed at a violent seizure of power, or forcible change of the constitutional order’). Even though according the prosecution, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has never been involved in violent actions, Mr Yakupov has been held in custody since 4 February 2015.

Yunusov, Naïl Vazhibovich, was born on 24 February 1989. A resident of Kazan, in 2008 he graduated from the Nizhnekamsk confectionery school as a pastry cook. He is married with a child. At the time of his arrest, he was not officially employed. As a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an organization banned in Russia, Mr Yunusov was sentenced by the Privolzhsky district military court to 17 years of imprisonment in a strict-regime penal colony under Part One of Art. 205.5 (‘Organisation of the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law’). He has been held in custody since 19 May 2015.
Zeitullayev, Ruslan Borisovich, was born on 15 June 1985. At the time of his arrest, he resided in the city of Sebastopol in Crimea. He is married with three daughters. He has incomplete secondary education. At the time of his arrest, he was officially unemployed and worked as a construction worker. He was charged under Part One of Art. 205.5 ('Organisation of the activities of an organization designated as terrorist under Russian law') of the Russian Criminal Code for his alleged membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, an organization banned in Russia that, even according to the prosecution, has never been involved in violent action, and sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment. Mr Zeitullayev has been held in custody since 23 January 2015.